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We have reached the 200th anniversary of our Constitution. Predictably, we still argue about its meaning and about the role of the
judiciary in interpreting it. There are a wide variety of views and often
heated debates about these questions. Yet, for all the appearance of
breadth, this debate in its entirety seems out of touch with central
features of constitutional law and the role of the courts in making it.
Today's theories of judicial review rely on a variety of images judges reasoning toward moral evolution 1 or deliberating civic virtue2
or discovering higher principles3 or perfecting the process4 or seeking
and following the plan laid out by the Framers. 5 There is grandeur in
these images. Yet, however attractive, these images belie the struggle
and reality of human decisionmaking in a complex society. To imagine that the Framers established a detailed plan which modern judges
can simply discover and apply trivializes the complexity and difficulty
of making a Constitution. Imagining courts as the central font of national principles, civic virtue, or moral evolution ignores the severe
limitations of the judiciary. Deliberation and contemplation, no matter
how attractive as attributes of individual decisionmaking, fit poorly in
the much different world of societal decisionmaking.
It is time for constitutional analysts to form constructs faithful to
the realities of constitutional decisionmaking. We live in an immense
and complex society. Our public decisions are made by complicated
processes in which voters, interest groups, lobbyists, and the press interact with legions of legislators, administrators, and other public
employees.
These governmental processes produce countless government decisions. No matter how aggressive the courts or grandiose the constitutional theory only a tiny percentage of these governmental actions can
ever be seriously reviewed by the judiciary. Whatever the fears of the
proponents of judicial restraint, the judiciary is a societal deciI. See, e.g., Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutio11a/
"Interpretation." 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 {1985); Perry, Noni11terpretative Review in Huma11
Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278 (1981).
2. See, e.g., Sunstein, Interest Groups ill American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
3. See, e.g., Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forum of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. l {1979).
4. See, e.g.• J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
5. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Bork, The Impossibility of
Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695.
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sionmaker already severely constrained by its physical limits. Moral
evolution, discovery of national principles, and the search for civic virtue - whatever those terms mean - are not dominated by the judiciary because they cannot be. 6
Yet, on rare occasions, the federal judiciary plays a significant role
in societal decisionmaking. These rare occasions define what we call
constitutional law and are themselves defined by a basic institutional
choice: the courts decide that they and not some other societal decisionmaker should resolve the substantive issue in question. From this
vantage point, the study of constitutional law becomes the study of
this institutional choice, which, in turn, means the study of alternative
societal decisionmakers, their comparison and matching. The judicial
role is defined by asking when a constrained and fragile judiciary
should substitute its decisions for a sometimes badly malfunctioning
political process.
The task facing judges is daunting. Before judges ever reach the
various analyses proposed by most constitutional commentators, they
already must have made broad-based and sweeping determinations allocating most decisions elsewhere. Even among the relatively small
number of decisions in which judges take preliminary interest, they
must continuously order and reorder the priorities for the use of their
limited resources as needs for and strains upon those resources become
more evident. The judiciary, like other societal institutions, must and
does make difficult and debatable institutional choices even if judges
do not always express or even recognize them. The central task for
constitutional scholars is to make these choices clearer and to help
judges and others to understand them and make them better.
This article attempts that task by exploring the elements of institutional choice in constitutional law. Part I takes an overview of the
general division of decisionmaking responsibility between the political
processes and the courts. It also examines the failures of existing theories to take account of this division of responsibility. Part II identifies
two theories of political malfunction - those circumstances in which
political processes are subject to significant doubt or distrust and,
therefore, prime candidates for judicial review. Part III examines the
characteristics - limits, biases, and abilities - of the judiciary and
the potential for judicial response to the political malfunctions dis6. Physical capacity is not the only limit on judicial activity. Limits on judicial ability and
institutional power also are important. Physical limits are not easily defined and are subject to
complex interactions with considerations of judicial ability and the tractability of the societal
issue involved. These questions will be considered in Part III.A infra.
My point here is that considering only physical limits, the judiciary cannot shoulder the
heroic tasks suggested by these theories. This point is explored further in Part I infra.
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cussed earlier. It explains why various forms of judicial response are
more appropriate for some types of political malfunction than for
others. The result is an overview of judicial response which provides
insights into what constitutional law is and can be. 7
This article and two previous ones show that institutional analysis
is essential but largely ignored in present constitutional scholarship. 8
This article confronts the task of building such an analysis, a task
complicated by a number of factors. Lack of data and of existing discourse means that identifying the relevant characteristics of the key
decisionmakers and matching their relative abilities with given societal
issues is treacherous, and that applications of the theory to specific
constitutional questions must too often be based on impressions and
intuitions. The task is also complicated by the inevitable interplay between the choice of institutions and the choice of societal goals. Institutional function and malfunction must be defined in terms of some set
of goals. In turn, whether any set of goals is sensible, attainable, or
attractive depends on how it operates through real world institutions.
In order to show the importance of institutional analysis, this article inevitably makes assumptions about institutional abilities and societal goals. Many of the more controversial choices are considered at
length in the body of the article. 9 I have found the particular conceptions of institutional failure and comparison presented here, as approximate and rough as they are, very useful in understanding
constitutional law, history, and commentary. But these particular
conceptions are secondary. I am primarily interested in showing that
careful analysis of institutional choice is essential for any constitutional theory no matter what its underlying perception of societal
7. The proposed analysis is used here for both positive (descriptive) and normative (prescriptive) purposes. Institutional forces are powerful enough that they force their way into judicial
opinions and decisions. As such, institutional analysis is important in understanding what judges
say and do. That does not mean, however, that the institutional analysis and choices made by
judges are always or even usually above criticism. Therefore, institutional analysis enters into
criticism and prescription as well as description and prediction.
8. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 366 (1984) [hereinafter Taking Institutions Seriously]; Komesar, Back to
the Future-An Institutional View ofMaking and Interpreting Constitutions, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev.
191 (1987) (hereinafter Back to the Future].
9. For the purposes of this article, for example, I have defined institutional function and
malfunction in terms of the representation of the interests, desires, and preferences of the people.
I am aware that such a choice of goals is unattractive to many analysts. Indeed, on some levels
of analysis it is unattractive to me. As I explain in the body of the article, this specification of
goals is, in part, the product of the inability of those who oppose preference to articulate alternative definitions of goals, let alone their institutional implications. Respect for citizen desires has
important claims for a place in any definition of societal goals. Whatever its failings as a com·
plete definition, I believe it serves sufficiently for present purposes. This subject is more fully
explored in Part 11.C infra.
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goals, and that such an analysis must pay serious attention to basic
features like physical resources and institutional size, the complexities
of aggregate or collective decisionmaking, and the comparative nature
of institutional choice. In this vein, the particular analytical conceptions and applications which follow are not meant to be the last word
on the subject. Quite the opposite, they are meant to open the inquiry.
I.

BASIC CONTEXTS

Before turning to an examination of the political process and the
judiciary as alternative decisionmakers, we must briefly describe two
contexts which are basic to the analysis which follows. The first is the
institutional context - an overview of the division of responsibility
between the judiciary and the political process. The second is the intellectual context - a brief review of the scholarly approaches to constitutional analysis. These two contexts are related and the failings of
many theories lie in their incompatibility with the simple and noncontroversial overview of societal decisionmaking presented here. 10
Very few governmental decisions have any serious potential for judicial scrutiny. Even at the height of the era of economic due process
- the era of the greatest, or at least the broadest, judicial activism only a tiny fraction of governmental action was actually subject to serious judicial review let alone at risk of invalidation. As a general
matter, the courts pose no threat to most governmental resolutions of
societal issues.
This limited judicial role is often ascribed to the questionable legitimacy of judicial dominance in a democracy. Evaluation of this common theme requires some subtlety. The terms of the Constitution and
the writings surrounding its framing reveal considerable distrust of democracy and majoritarianism on the part of the Framers 11 - a distrust which played an important role in the construction of our
Constitution and which, in turn, is central in the analysis of political
malfunction which follows. Yet consistent with the theme of this article, the Framers were faced with constrained institutional choices and,
in the end, they chose democratic forms even though they encumbered
this democracy with skewed patterns of representation, screened it by
elite electors, and balanced and checked it by various branches and
10. The critique of existing theories presented here is a brief review of the critiques presented
previously in Taking Institutions Seriously, supra note 8, and Back to the Future, supra note 8.
The critiques of the searchers for principles and fundamental rights can be found in Taking
Institutions Seriously, supra note 8, at 425-40, and in Back to the Future, supra note 8, at 210-16.
The critique of Ely's theory can be found in Taking Institutions Seriously, supra note 8, at 398425. The critique of the originalists can be found in Back to the Future, supra note 8, at 194-210.
11. See Part 11.D infra.
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levels of decisionmaking. As such, majoritarianism remained and remains an essential component of our Constitution. The significant
weight given majoritarianism by Framers who understood and feared
its dangers makes judicial dominance an uncomfortable proposition. 12
Beyond arguments about legitimacy, however, judicial dominance
of societal decisionmaking is simply physically impossible. It boggles
the mind to even imagine the judiciary seriously examining all governmental action. Government (aside from the judiciary) has grown
much faster than the judiciary.13 Massive long-term governmental
12. Majoritarianism can take several meanings here. In general, it simply means majority
rule - by one more than half. But it can refer to larger necessary majorities such as the twothirds or three-quarters requirements which occasionally surface in the Constitution.
In theoretical work on collective decisionmaking, the term majority is really anything less
than unanimity. In the field of public choice, a crossover between political science and economics, there has been a great deal of work done on the positive (descriptive) and normative (prescriptive) implications of less than unanimous collective choice mechanisms (majoritarianism).
As a general matter, majoritarianism is always faced with the danger of cycling or intransivity.
This means that choice A can be preferred to choice B and B to C without it necessarily meaning
thatA will be chosen over C. Such cycling presents problems for the translation of citizen preference into collective action because it means that choice can be governed by how the issue is posed
to the collective decisionmaker. In our example, A may win if paired with B but lose if paired
with C although B would win if paired with C. Cycling and its normative implications for collective choice is the core of the famous Arrow Impossibility Theorem. See generally K. ARROW,
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). The implications of cycling, both
normative and positive, are nicely laid out in Dennis Mueller's excellent summary of public
choice theory, D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979).
The possibility of cycling is disturbing in a nonunanimous system and raises questions, at
least in theory, about the reliance on nonunanimous collective choice inherent in our societal
preference for majoritarianism. For present purposes, we can escape this quandary by taking as
given the present system with its significant reliance on nonunanimous choice (majoritarianism).
Any analysis of judicial review, as apposed to global constitutional reform, would have to take
such a situation as given.
But, even if we were to move to the rarified world of global reform, majoritarianism would in
all likelihood prevail at least for a large and complex society. Majoritarianism is flawed, but the
alternatives - unanimity or dictatorship - seem worse. In particular, unanimity is unattainable
in most instances. Indeed if it were unattainable for even a small percentage of societal decisions
and nonunanimous choice had to be allowed in, such nonunanimous choice would quickly spread
unless there was some way to specify property rights or other designations of those areas which
were off limits to majoritarianism. As I have argued elsewhere, such initial specifications are
highly unlikely if not impossible in real world constitution-making. See Back to the Future, supra
note 8, at 198-99. We will return to this theme when we examine the "civic virtue" analysts. See
Part 11.C infra.
As a general matter, majoritarianism is an inherent part of our collective decisionmaking and
would likely be so even if we opened the scope of inquiry to global constitutional reform. The
issue here is the role of nonmajoritarian (less majoritarian) mechanisms like the judiciary in a
system which is largely if sometimes uncomfortably built on majoritarianism.
13. In 1980 the total expenditure of the federal judiciary was about $564 million. See FISCAL
SERVICE, BUREAU OF GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL OPERATIONS, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,
TREASURY COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS, EXPENDITURES AND BALANCES OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 13 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 U.S. ACCOUNTS]. While the data in
1980 U.S. AccouNTS makes it difficult to calculate administrative costs for Congress, the executive branch, and the federal administrative agencies, a conservative estimate yields a figure in
excess of $94 billion - over 160 times the budget for the judiciary. See id. at 110-24, 132-508.
In 1925, the analogous figures were approximately $19 million for the judiciary, see DIVISION OF
BOOKKEEPING AND WARRANTS, U.S. TREASURY DEPT., COMBINED STATEMENT OF THE RE·
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programs like national defense, welfare, criminal justice, and education are administered by enormous agencies that employ millions of
people. These programs produce reviewable action at a virtually uncountable rate. 14 The physical capacity of the courts to review governmental action is simply dwarfed by the capacity of governments to
produce such action.1s
A central role for majoritarian decisionmaking and the severe limits on judicial resources do not, however, preclude a serious or important judicial role. The judiciary has the resources with which to
review a significant, if relatively small, subset of governmental decisions and has done so especially in the past century. Our affection for
democratic forms has been tempered throughout our history with
CElPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS BALANCES, ETC., OF THE UNITED STATES 131 (1925) [hereinafter
1925 U.S. AccouNTS], and $424 million for the political branches, see id. at 40-253, the latter
approximately twenty-two times the size of the former. In other words, the administrative
budget of the political branches had grown more than seven times as fast as the budget of the
judiciary.
Although the most dramatic source of the difference is the growth in administrative agency
budgets, compare 1980 U.S. AccouNTS, supra, at 140-508, with 1925 U.S. ACCOUNTS, supra, at
49-253, even the figures for Congress and the executive proper dwarf those for the courts. In
1980, that figure was over $1.25 billion, or more than twice the judicial budget. See 1980 U.S.
AccouNTS, supra, at 110-24, 132-38. In 1925, the budget for the federal judiciary (excluding
expenditures for penal institutions) was only about thirty percent less than the administrative
budget for Congress and the executive. See 1925 U.S. ACCOUNTS, supra, at 47-48, 131.
14. For example, the number oflaws passed in a session provides some measure oflegislative
activity by federal and state governments. During the 98th Congress, 623 Public Laws were
passed. CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., CALENDARS OF
THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND HISTORY OF LEGISLATION 19-53
(1983). Approximately 70,000 bills were enacted by the fifty states during the 1983-1985 legislative sessions. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 114-20
(1986-1987) (sum of the numbers in the tables therein). No similar compilation of data exists for
local governments.
No complete measure of federal administrative activity is available, although the number of
documents published annually in the Federal Register for incorporation into the Code ofFederal
Regulations provides some indication offederal rulemaking capacity. In 1986, 4,589 documents
were published (5,154 in 1984 and 4,853 in 1985). Telephone interview with Internal Records
Office, Federal Register, National Archives (June 1987). The quantity of state and local administrative regulations has not been reported. The number of informal, reviewable decisions by federal, state, and local agencies is unknown but probably "runs in the hundreds of millions or
billions annually." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 8 (1975).
15. For some indication of the strains of broad-based judicial review consider the discussion
of the era of economic due process in Part Ill.A infra.
Of course, if one imagined that the judiciary could deal with vast sets of issues by some simple
sweeping solution, physical capacity would not seem such a limit. Some types of issues may be
more tractable- conducive to sweeping solutions. We will discuss the interaction between tractability and judicial response subsequently. See Part III.A infra. It is, however, a flight of fancy
to imagine that the judiciary can issue broad maxims that would suffice as serious judicial review
of the vast, diverse, and complex mass that is governmental decisionmaking.
There is, of course, no fixed limit on the size of the federal judiciary. The difficulties ascribed
to physical limits might be swept away by increasing the size of the judiciary. But, given the tasks
of review described previously, that increase would have to be very dramatic to negate the general point that physical limits are important in understanding constitutional law. Such changes
seem such a remote possibility that they are ignored here.
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fears and doubts. As we shall see, variations in the strain on judicial
resources and the degree of doubt about the political processes help
define the small subset of issues in which the judiciary will dominate.
The picture of societal decisionmaking presented here is simple:
The political process is the dominant decisionmaker; the judiciary occasionally dominates, but is usually dormant. 16 I have not yet attempted to describe Qet alone prescribe) the borders between the small
enclaves of judicial activism and the larger terrain of judicial passivism. Virtually all constitutional observers would have to agree with
this loose description of judicial activity. It also seems loose enough to
command general acceptance even as prescription. Judicial activity
could be increased to include the tasks desired by the most activist
legal commentator without violating this picture.
Yet, many existing theories of judicial review are based on conceptions which are inconsistent with even this simple picture. These theories often envision the judiciary as the institution entrusted with the
revelation and protection of long-term principles, and public values. 17
But public values, moral issues, and principles are implicated in all
important societal issues, and do not differentiate among societal issues in any way which would define a set of issues for the judiciary to
decide. If the courts are the major arbiters of public values, moral
concerns, and basic principles and these are present for all important
societal issues, the judiciary must dominate societal decisionmaking,
with a minor and undefined role assigned the political process. Such a
position violates the simple overview presented earlier.
A variant of the "searcher for principle" role - the "protector of
' fundamental rights or values" role - has found its way into constitutional jurisprudence. Judges are enamored of the notion of "fundamental rights." They tell us that if legislation impinges on these
rights, then strict scrutiny is applied. 18 This support from the judiciary has in tum promoted great interest in "fundamentalness" on the
16. Throughout this article, I contrast the judiciary with the political process. This division
is meant to reflect the distinction between reviewer and reviewed. In that sense, the political
process includes executive, legislative, and administrative decisionmakers at the federal, state,
and local levels (and even state courts). I do not mean to suggest that all of these various
processes are identical in such attributes as their tendency to malfunction or the form of malfunction. The relevant issue will always be the characteristics of that portion of the political process
whose decision is under review. Nor do I mean to suggest that the judiciary is not, from some
vantage points, part of the political process. The analysis here is concerned with judicial review,
and for those purposes the judiciary stands in contrast to the rest of the political process whose
actions it reviews.
17. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 23-28 (1962); Hart, Tlte
Supreme Court, 1958 Term - Foreword: The Time Cltart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84
(1959); Fiss, supra note 3, at 5-17.
18. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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part of scholars.19
The concept, however, cannot be taken seriously as a means of
defining the judicial role. In its most direct form, it defines a judicial
role which clearly violates the basic divisions of societal decisionmaking set out previously. If fundamental means important or basic, then
the doctrine would give the most central societal decisionmaking to
the judiciary, not the legislature. In a complex and vast society like
ours, that would likely mean that the judiciary would operate on a
scale way beyond its existing physical capacity and with an authority
totally inconsistent with our basic notions. 20
The image of the judiciary as the determiner of fundamental values
or long-term principles, a favorite among judges and commentators,
simply does not fit the task for which it is most often used: defining
the role of judicial review. The central theme of this article is that this
role can only be defined by considering the relative ability of the courts
and the political process to resolve societal issues, a difficult task.
Two alternative theories exist, however, which suggest shortcuts to
this difficult task. First, John Ely's theory of judicial review allocates
decisionmaking by simply dividing societal issues into two types process and substance - and allocating process issues to the judiciary
and substance issues to the political process. Ely strongly criticizes
fundamental rights analyses like the ones just discussed for calling
upon the courts to make basic societal value judgments. 21 According
to Ely, these value judgments are the business of the political process.
The judiciary's only task is to make sure that political decisionmakers
abide by the rules of the game. Courts must enforce these rules of the
game because the players (the legislators) cannot police themselves. 22
The courts should concern themselves with the process of making
value judgments, not with the value judgments themselves. Ely's identification of two separate spheres facilitates a simple institutional allocation of societal issues: render unto the political process that which is
19. See, e.g., Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89

YALE

L.J. 624 (1980).

20. It is quite clear that the courts actually use the term fundamental in ways unrelated to
any common sense meaning. The Supreme Court's list of fundamental subjects excludes many of
the most important in any society. Omitted are not only education, housing, and basic sustenance, but also peace and war, environmental concerns, and, in general, the use of most of those
resources (material and human) that seem crucial to our welfare - societal or individual. The
Supreme Court has made clear that societal importance is not the bench mark of what is "fundamental" - a message not very difficult to read into the observed pattern of their decisions. The
use of fundamental rights in constitutional jurisprudence is examined and critiqued in Part
III.B.2 infra.

21. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 43-72.
22. See id. at 101-03.

666

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:657

the political process' (substance) and render unto the courts that
which is the courts' (process).
But this neat split of issues with its underlying idea that judicial
review can take place without judicial value judgments is based on a
basic misconception. 23 It reflects a recurrent theme that the decisions
made by courts and legislatures are somehow different. It may be that
courts and legislatures - or more broadly, the judiciary and the political process - decide differently. Indeed this. article supposes that
they do. But that does not mean that they operate on different issues.
Judicial review is judicial reconsideration of an issue already decided
by another societal decisionmaker. When that reconsideration leads
to invalidation of the governmental action, the courts are remaking
social policy. Courts are operating as alternative societal
decisionmakers.
Ely's belief that reaction to problems in the political process should
be important in defining the judicial role is one I share. But judicial
concern about political malfunction does not free the judiciary from
having to make societal decisions and, therefore, basic value judgments. Political malfunction only defines one element in the allocation
of societal decisionmaking. An adequate analysis of this allocation
also requires consideration of the ability of the judiciary to make (or
remake) these societal decisions. The issues Ely terms "process" may
have special attraction for the courts because their correct determination improves the political process. But these issues like any other
societal issues demand value judgments and, therefore, pose questions
about relative institutional ability which cannot be resolved by Ely's
simple dichotomy.24
Originalism offers a second "easy way" around the difficulties of
institutional choice. According to originalism, no one in the present
generation needs to choose among societal decisionmakers since those
choices were already made by the Framers. There is, of course, the
institutional choice whether to be bound by the decisions of the Framers or to remake that decision now. Much of the debate about
originalism involves the question of whether the original intent should
be followed. But that debate is largely pointless.
On virtually all important issues of institutional choice or substantive results, the Constitution and the intent of the Framers remain
23. There are several problems with Ely's analysis. These problems, along with the virtues of
Ely's approach, are discussed in Taking Institutions Seriously, supra note 8, at 398-425. Other
aspects of Ely's theory are considered in Part 11.C infra.
24. This issue is considered at length in Part 111.B.1 infra.
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equivocal. 25 The brief text of the Constitution offers little detail on
institutional allocation; most of the detailed provisions of the Constitution concern institutional design. Nor will an examination of the
surrounding records yield unequivocal results.
Answers from the past are unavailable for many reasons. The logistics of record keeping and the identification of relevant views among
conflicting statements provide problems. Problems in the use of language, no doubt tempered by the Framers' desire not to bind future
generations unnecessarily, also led to equivocal results. 26 Perhaps
most important, constitution framing in the American experience is a
collective enterprise. The original Constitution was the product of
group decisionmaking - the Philadelphia Convention and the state
ratifying conventions. In turn, the Civil War amendments were the
product of Congress and the state legislatures. Collective intent is extremely difficult if not impossible to define, let alone unequivocally establish in a particular instance. Like the analysis of other large
processes, the analysis of constitution framing, an example of aggregate decisionmaking, forecloses simple extrapolation from individual
decisionmaking and harbors the possibility for counterintuitive results. 27 Despite the continuous assertion that original intent dictates
results, careful analysis indicates otherwise.
There are no simple shortcuts around the difficult questions surrounding the allocation of societal decisionmaking. By a gradual process of accretion, the federal judiciary has acquired an increasingly
significant role in this allocation. The rest of this article attempts to
construct an analytical framework capable of understanding and improving these allocative decisions which form the core of constitutional law. The analysis builds on themes which have already surfaced
such as the importance of resource constraints and the degree of distrust of popular government.
The formulation proposed here is, in concept, quite simple. Judges
should, and to a significant extent do, consider the relative ability of
the political process and the judicial process to resolve the societal
issue in question. Because so much must be left with the political process, a heavy presumption of control by the political process will inevi25. This subject is considered at length in Back to the Future, supra note 8, at 194-210. The
treatment here is a brief recap of that analysis.
26. Such problems of language are discussed in Back to the Future, supra note 8, at 198-203.
27. Prominent among these is the possibility of cycling discussed earlier. See note 12 supra.
Such occurrences throw substantial doubt even on some of the most substantially documented
assertions of original intent. See Back to the Future, supra note 8, at 203-10 (examining Raoul
Berger's assertions about the fourteenth amendment).
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tably result. One consideration in overcoming this presumption is the
d~gree of malfunction in the political process.
The existence and severity of political malfunction, however, is
only part of the institutional balance which defines judicial review.
The issue is the relative ability of the judiciary to rework the societal
issues involved, requiring us to scrutinize the judicial alternative also.
Like the analysis of the political process, the analysis of the judiciary
must recognize the systemic character of the adjudicative process. In
the rest of this article I will construct a theory of political malfunction
and match it with the potential for judicial response.

II.

POLITICAL MALFUNCTION

Theories of political malfunction should be able to integrate those
features of political decisionmaking which have traditionally troubled
people, and be sophisticated enough to recognize the complexity of
decisionmaking in our society. They must be simple and intuitively
appealing without totally suppressing complexity and the existence of
counterintuitive features. The two simple conceptions presented here
capture basic impressions of political malfunction common both today
and throughout our constitutional history. Yet they also comprehend
the systemic nature of societal decisionmaking, which goes beyond the
intentions, purposes, or desires (good or evil) of government officials to
recognize a complex variety of interactions between these officials and
the general populace or subgroups (constituencies) within that
populace.
A.

The Spectrum and the Poles: Fear of the Many
and Fear of the Few

Two visions of political malfunction - one stressing fear of the
many and the other stressing fear of the few - coexist in our traditional views of government. At various times and by various parties,
one or the other of these conceptions has been envisioned as the sole or
paramount evil. In fact, however, both conceptions are viable representations of serious political malfunction applicable to different but
important instances of political decisionmaking. These polar conceptions and their different spheres of relevance form the core of the theory of political malfunction employed here. 28
Recent scholarship by John Ely and Bruce Ackerman about the
28. I refer to the conception of political malfunction which stresses the undue influence of the
majority at the expense of the minority as "majoritarian bias" and the conception which stresses
the undue influence of the minority at the expense of the majority as "minoritarian bias."
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famous Carolene Products footnote underscores the importance of
both of these polar conceptions as well as the conflict between them.
United States v. Carolene Products Co. 29 was one of a set of cases
which marked the end' of the era of economic due process and ushered
in the modern trend of easy validation of economic regulation. The
case is most important, however, not for what it decided - that a
federal ban on the sale of milk substitute was valid - but because of
what it announced it had not decided. In footnote four, the Court
declared that it was not deciding to retire from serious judicial review
of all types of legislation; 30 Legislatures may be given wider leeway
but they were not given carte blanche.
In the third paragraph of the footnote, the Court expressed special
concern about statutes where "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities." 31 In his theory of judicial review discussed earlier, John Ely hews closely to the position of the Carolene Products
Court. 32 He uses the conditions set out in the footnote to define malfunction of the political process and with it the role of constitutional
judicial review. His approach echoes strongly the Court's concern
about the treatment of "discrete and insular minorities."
In a recent article, Bruce Ackerman argued that this conception of
legislative malfunction, if it ever correctly captured the dominant form
29. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
30. Footnote four reads:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the
right to vote, see Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536; Nixon v. Condon, 297 U.S. 233; on restraints upon the dissemination of information, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S.
697, 713-714, 718-720, 722; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233; Lovell v. Griffin,
supra; on interferences with political organizations, see Stromberg v. California, supra, 369;
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-378; Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242; and see Holmes, J., in Git/ow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673; as to
prohibition of peaceable assembly, see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities; or whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (some citations omitted).
31. 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
32. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 73-104.
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of legislative malfunction, fails to do so now. 33 In his view, the insularity and discreteness which characterizes racial and religious minorities has become a political virtue allowing these groups to more easily
organize and influence political decisions. Thus, he contends that today judicial concern should shift to nondiscrete and noninsular groups
where dispersion and assimilation make organization and adequate
representation difficult. In particular, Ackerman points to such
groups as women and the poor. Ackerman's theory represents a wellarticulated alternative to such Carolene Products-based theories as that
of John Ely.
Although there are serious problems with both Ackerman's and
Ely's analyses, 34 the work of these two constitutional scholars highlights the ongoing significance of these two polar conceptions of political malfunction and the tension between them. This tension between
33. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
34. The form of political malfunction Ackerman articulates is much broader and much older
than he indicates. The overrepresentation of concentrated minorities was a major concern in the
framing of the Constitution, in the Jacksonian era, and in the post-Civil War period. See note 53
infra. This concern was influential in shaping judicial review during the era of economic due
process where there was significant judicial distrust of legislation like that considered in Carolene
Products (the case, not the footnote). Indeed the classic example of a dispersed and unorganized
group is consumers, who are damaged by a political bias in favor of those well-organized minorities of producers we have come to call special interests.
The unseen lineage and breadth of this form of political malfunction seriously reduces the
cogency of Ackerman's position on judicial review. For example, he extols the wisdom of the
Carolene Products Court in breaking from the era of economic due process. This position is the
shared gospel of virtually all modem constitutional scholars: the era of economic due process
was bad. Yet this bad era focused at least part of its attention on special interest legislation.
When that era ended and a greater presumption of constitutionality was reestablished, the
change provided a great deal more breathing room for the very bias which concerns Ackerman.
See J. HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 74-75 (1977). The potential
for overrepresentation of discrete minorities in the form of special interest legislation remains
high today. The conception of the legislative process Ackerman points to in asserting that
women and the poor need greater protection also means that consumers and taxpayers need even
greater protection.
I am not asserting that women and the poor do not have special claims for protection or that
if they are to be given a special place we must return to the era of economic due process. We will
consider that subject later in the article. I am asserting that a theory of judicial review based
solely on a conception of political malfunction which stresses the problems of dispersion and lack
of organization will not provide the route to the positions Ackerman advocates. Even if the
theory of political malfunction Ackerman proposes were better tailored to achieve the results he
seeks, however, it would be problematic because it is based solely on the existence of political
malfunction. As such it, like Ely's theory, is single institutional rather than comparative institutional. A complete institutional analysis requires that we also consider the limits on the judiciary. As we shall see, variation in the ability of the judiciary rather than political malfunction
explains the stronger case for gender relative to economic due process. Analysis of judicial ability also helps explain why, despite the seriousness of bias against dispersed majorities, judicial
review does and should remain concerned with protection of discrete and insular minorities. As
we shall see, there are also reasons to envision the political malfunction associated with gender
and poverty as quite different. See Part 111.B.2 infra.
The problems with Ely's theory have been discussed at length in Taking Institutions Seri·
ously, supra note 8, at 398-425. Other aspects have been considered in Part I supra, and will be
considered in Part 11.C infra.
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majoritarian bias and minoritarian bias provides a way to understand
our constitutional tradition by exposing the character of distrust of the
political process at any given time and over time. Neither of these
polar forms of political malfunction dominates all times or all aspects
of any one time. That these conceptions of political malfunction have
both a long history and an intuitive appeal today warns against eliminating either characterization from institutional analysis. Ackerman
and Ely fail to understand this. This article will focus on those factors
which make one or the other of these forms of malfunction more likely
in a given setting. The ensuing sections examine these conceptions,
their basic settings, their traditions and history, and their parameters
and determinants.

B.

The Spectrum: A Closer Look at the Definition of the Polar
Conceptions and a Search for Determinants

When de Tocqueville used the phrase "tyranny of the majority" or
Madison spoke of the deleterious effect of majoritarian factions, they
did not explain the mechanics of these evils. Although we can sense
the problems inherent in suggestive phrases like tyranny of the majority or special interest legislation, it is not as easy to spell out those
elements which define, let alone produce, these skewed allocations of
influence. 35 What constitutes majoritarian or minoritarian bias?
When is it more likely that we will have majoritarian rather than minoritarian bias? This section explores these questions beginning with a
brief description of minoritarian and majoritarian bias, which relates
both forms of malfunction to the same skewed distribution of impacts
or effects. It then examines the factors which make one or the other of
these biases more likely.
1. Minoritarian and Majoritarian Bias Defined
Minoritarian bias supposes an inordinate power of the few at the
expense of the many. The power of these few stems from better access
to the seats of power through personal influence, organization, information, or sophistication. In our society, influence can be gained by
identifying important political figures and delivering what those political figures want. The terms of trade may be as crass as graft or as
innocent as information. Honest public servants commonly lack the
information they need for decisionmaking. Educating these decisionmakers is a route to influence. Elected officials can also be influ35. Since 1980, over fifty law review articles have employed some variant of the phrase "tyranny of the majority." None define it.
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enced by promises of campaign contributions or threats of negative
media.
Graft, propaganda, and political support take organization and resources. Here a majority, each of whose members suffers only a small
loss from a government action, can be at a significant disadvantage to
a minority with large per capita gains. If the per capita loss is low
enough, members of this majority may not even recognize it. Envision
a social program which would produce ten million dollars in benefits
spread over ten individuals but which imposed one hundred million
dollars in losses spread over ten million people. Though total costs
easily outstrip total benefits, it is entirely plausible that the program
would be implemented without opposition. The loss is so small per
capita that members of the majority may lack the incentive even to
recognize the existence of the legislation, or that they may be harmed
by it.
Even if a member of the majority knows of the proposed legislation
and recognizes its dangers, the low personal stakes limit the motivation to expend resources aimed at influencing the outcome. Each individual has small incentive to spend time or money in organizing the
efforts of others. Such efforts are further frustrated by the limited likelihood that other members of the majority will respond. These other
members may not recognize the dangers in the proposed legislation,
and therefore expenditures must be made to educate them. If they do
understand, they will be inclined to "free ride": they may refuse to
contribute supposing that others will carry the load. When free riding
becomes pervasive, no one contributes and the position goes unrepresented. In tum, the prospect that others will free ride and the expenditure of resources necessary to overcome it may well discourage any.
efforts to activate the dormant majority. 36
Majoritarian bias can be defined as an opposite response to the
same skewed distribution of impacts which characterized minoritarian
bias. The difference lies in our suppositions about the political process. If we suppose that everyone understands and votes their interests
then, in a political process which counts votes for or against but which
does not consider the severity of impact or the intensity of feeling
about the issue, a low-impact majority can prevail over a high-impact
minority even though the majority will gain little and the minority is
harmed greatly. The power of the many lies simply in their numbers
and the bias arises because the few are disproportionately harmed.
36. See generally M.

OISON, THE

Lome OF

COLLECTIVE ACTION

(1965).
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2. Determinants of Bias

These two quite different conceptions of the political process display two quite different modes of influence. Greater organization is
the political advantage of the group with more concentrated impacts;
more votes is the political advantage of the group with more dispersed
impacts. Both biases seem to share a common context - a skewed
distribution of impacts. The same distribution of impacts (small per
capita on one side and large per capita on the other) can cause severe
problems of vastly different sorts depending on the assumptions one
makes about the workings of the political process. Different settings
or contexts have different potential for these biases. In this section, we
examine those factors which make one bias more likely than the other.
a. Information, organization, and the choice ofbias. The costs of
obtaining information about relevant issues and the costs of organizing
efforts to influence government decisions are important in determining
the likelihood of a given bias. Factors which increase information or
organization costs make minoritarian bias more likely. Factors which
decrease information and organization costs increase the chance of
majoritarian bias. For example, more information and sophistication
is necessary to recognize, understand, and address more complex issues. In this connection, continuing or long-term exposure to an issue
provides an advantage. Those who have dealt with an issue often acquire information and sophistication which the recently exposed must
now obtain.
The experience necessary to identify and react to social issues does
not always or even usually emanate from a careful, calculated immersion in a subject. Basic cultural institutions such as religious and ethnic associations provide common background which make some
societal distinctions or issues more familiar. Basic divisions and distinctions like ethnicity, race, and gender evolve into simple symbols
which, in tum, create easy association and interest in issues directly
involving them. These simple symbols and associations provide basic
building blocks for cognition which make attempts to inform or organize a group easier.
The importance of information underscores the power and importance of the media. In a society with a growing population and ever
more complex and changing technology, the influence of the media
increases. Issues flagged by the media or by public figures who gain
the attention of the media are issues about which the public has "easy
access." Media attention and political malfunction can interact in a
number of ways. Media manipulated by concentrated interests be-

674

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:657

comes just another channel for minoritarian bias. On the other hand,
investigative reporting which uncovers information hidden from the
general public by politicians or special interests helps correct minoritarian bias. Easy availability of information to a majority who
would not otherwise understand an issue or even perceive its relevance
to them severely lessens the probability of minoritarian bias. 37
Effective influence also requires understanding the process of influence itself. Some government processes are more accessible than
others. The larger the number of decisionmakers, the more complex
their procedures, and the more physically remote they are, the more
difficult it is to understand how the process of influence works and the
more expensive it is to use it. High-paid, professional lobbyists have
knowledge and contacts which they sell to those who wish to influence
the process. Less accessible processes require more expertise and, in
turn, stress the need for organization and the pooling of funds in order
to accumulate or purchase this expertise. 38
The important element here is the degree of complexity, understanding, and access and, in turn, the degree of advantage for concentrated interests. This advantage varies with subject matter,
jurisdiction, and the characteristics of the decisionmaker. The more
the general public understands and the more accessible the process of
influence, the less the advantage of concentrated over dispersed interests. As the advantage of concentrated groups lessens and dispersed
groups increases, we see a trade-off between the danger of minoritarian
bias and the danger of majoritarian bias.
b. Mixed biases and the case of the catalytic subgroup. We have
thus far treated the majority as though each member had the same per
capita impact. Dropping this assumption reveals an important potential ingredient in activating the majority. Subgroups within the otherwise low per capita majority may have per capita impact high enough
to provide members of this subgroup with sufficient incentive to educate and activate the less interested members of the majority. A concentrated subgroup capable of awakening the dormant majority has a
potent source of political clout unavailable even to better informed,
organized, and funded minorities - the threat of a majoritarian uprising. Whether and to what extent such a subgroup can actually activate
the majority depends on the factors we have already discussed. In es37. We will return to the role of the media in the correction or aggravation of political malfunction in our consideration of the role of first amendment protection. See Part 111.B.1 infra.
38. As we shall see, conflict over such structural elements which determined the accessibility
offederal political officials fueled the debates over the original Constitution. See Part 11.C infra.
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sence, the concentrated subgroup operates as a catalyst increasing the
probability of activating the majority.
3.

Majoritarian Bias and the Characteristics of Protected Minorities

Significant judicial concern about mistreatment o( politically weak
minorities, foreshadowed in the Carolene Products footnote discussed
previously, surfaces in modem equal protection law with its focus on
well-defined racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. A similar concern
for politically disadvantaged minorities is patent in the notion of
majoritarian bias employed in this article. But the criteria used by the
courts to define the need for minority protection - discreteness, insularity, 39 and immutability4<> - appear quite different from the characteristics of majoritarian bias stressed here - an active majority and a
disproportionately harmed minority. Despite initial appearances,
however, strong links exist between those characteristics traditionally
stressed by the courts and the likelihood of severe majoritarian bias as
defined in this article. Although a full examination of the judicial
treatment of minorities must wait until we have more fully explored
the limits and potentials of the judiciary, exploration of these links
here provides a better understanding of the conceptions of political
malfunction just presented.
Given the skewed distribution of impacts, the more discrete, insular, and immutable the minority, the more likely the existence of a
stable majority willing to suppress the minority. Because majoritarian
bias supposes large per capita costs for the minority with much lower
per capita benefits for the majority, slipping into minority status carries dire results. In such a situation, members of the majority would
want to feel secure that the significant negative impacts of this government action did not apply to them. To reassure members of the majority, the disadvantaged minority would have to be clearly defined.
In other words, these minorities would have to be safe targets.
Discrete, insular, and immutable minorities are safe targets. By
definition, discrete groups are easily delimited and identified - perhaps even physically identifiable. The clear criteria associated with
discreteness promise less error in administration and greater security
for members of the majority. Insularity limits interaction with the majority, minimizing the chance that negative impacts will indirectly spill
over to the majority. Insular groups are often geographically local39. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
40. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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ized, making it easier to target effects without fear of spillover. 41
A group can be immutable in two senses - entry and exit. As the
term is commonly employed, it denotes the inability to escape a given
classification. If someone is black, they stay black. As such any damage which befalls the group falls on its members forever; it cannot be
avoided. This usage is consistent with the idea of gaining benefits by
picking on a safe target. Exclusion from jobs or other opportunities
works most effectively for the majority if the members of the minority
cannot escape to the majority.
Immutable can also mean that a category cannot be entered. In
this sense, a completely immutable group is the safest target of all
since there is no probability that a member of the majority will suffer
the disadvantages. Some categories such as race and gender are immutable in both senses. Others, such as alienage, are immutable only
in the second sense, but that is sufficient to make them a safe target.
Insular, discrete, and immutable minorities are in danger because a
majority, if it were politically active, would be willing to impose disproportionate burdens on them which it would not as freely impose if
members of that majority faced a substantial risk of bearing these burdens. 42 As such, disproportionate burdens on minorities, one of the
conditions for majoritarian bias, is closely linked with insularity, discreteness, and immutability.
Majoritarian bias, however, also requires a politically active majority. The distinctions and divisions which define traditional minorities
ease the task of activating the usually dormant low-impact majority.
The more familiar a classification or source of difference the easier it is
to draw the dormant majority's attention and move it to act. Discreteness and insularity contribute here: strong, clear distinctions simplify
communicating with and organizing the majority. Ethnic, religious,
and racial differences are simple and traditional sources of definition.
People, exposed to these simple symbols at an early age, recognize and
react to them easily. Simple symbols decrease the costs of communication, information, and organization, thereby making it more likely
that the majority will be active rather than dormant. When these sim41. When the Carotene Products Court chose the phrases "discrete and insular" to define
minorities in need of judicial protection, Nazi racism was on the rise in Europe. Jews, a tradi·
tional minority, were ghettoized and forced to wear identifying badges, and so became easily
identifiable safe targets for dismissal from jobs, confiscation of property, and extermination. Had
the threat of such severe mistreatment been more diffuse, it would have not been nearly so politically tolerable to the German people.
42. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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ple symbols also define safe targets, political figures can tap majority
support.
Thus, the criteria used to identify traditional minorities also identify severe instances of majoritarian bias. Disproportionate impacts require safe targets. Such safety is greatest when the target is discrete,
insular, and immutable. Activating a dormant majority is made easier
by the simple symbols inherent in traditional categories like race, religion, ethnicity, and gender.
C.

The Focus on Systemic Representation

The conceptions of political malfunction I have set out picture
governmental decisionmakers as large and complex institutions in
which the interaction of many forces or influences determine outcomes. Decisions are made by large systems rather than a few government officials. Political malfunction is defined by failures of
representation in a system as a whole. This emphasis on the larger
system better reflects the realities of governmental decisionmaking
than approaches which focus only on the characteristics of official actors such as legislators. As such the conception employed here differs
significantly from several existing constitutional theories which define
political malfunction in terms of the mental states of government
officials.
John Ely's theory of judicial review is the preeminent example of
an analysis built around a conception of political malfunction which
stresses the importance of the mental states of government officials.
This conception is particularly important to Ely's analysis of equal
protection law. For Ely, the essence of political malfunction is illicit
motivation on the part of governmental officials in the form either of
direct animosity to a given group or self-serving stereotypes which degrade this group. Ely offers a simple hypothetical to make his point.43
A platoon leader is given the task of choosing three men for dangerous
duty. If the leader chooses on a random basis or on the basis of some
characteristics appropriate to the task, the choice would be considered
fair. If, on the other hand, the leader choose,s based on personal animus or self-serving stereotypes, the choice would be considered unfair
and inappropriate. The central feature of political malfunction, Ely
would argue, is the motivation of the government decisionmaker.
In contrast, the conception of political malfunction presented in
this article emphasizes forces permeating the entire political process,
such as voting rules, jurisdictional size, or characteristics of the popu43. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 137-39.
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lation (especially those concerned with the issue). Voters, lobbyists,
and others of influence are as important as legislators. Once one considers the implications of these systemic forces, a conception of political malfunction based on the personal animus or stereotyping of
legislators seems too limited a basis for defining political malfunction.
A closer look at Ely's simple hypothetical shows why.
Suppose we were aware of a platoon leader who hated or stereotyped the children of his immediate superiors. We might consider this
unfair or inappropriate, but would we call for external review and control? Incentives already in place make it unlikely that the platoon
leader would base his selection on these mental states. In fact, the
examples Ely uses to show his theory at work in constitutional law
always involve judicial protection for minorities or other groups who
are politically underrepresented in the larger system. Ely's theory,
however, defines a much broader set of persons in need of protection
than do his examples. Legislators differ from and may dislike or prejudge people who are not underrepresented in the general political
process. Most legislators are not extremely wealthy. Most are not or
have not been farmers or members of labor unions. Legislators may
well envy and despise the rich and hold simplistic and demeaning
views of laborers or farmers. But these groups are usually able to defend themselves within the political process. Farmers and union members are a powerful voting block. The wealthy are a concentrated
group likely to be able to influence the political process through such
channels as political contributions, graft, or lobbying. These groups
do not need protection outside of the political system because animus
toward these groups by governmental officials is controlled by factors
within the system. Ely's theory calls for such protection.
Legislator animus or stereotyping also seems a dubious necessary
condition for political malfunction. Legislation which severely harms
a racial minority underrepresented in the larger political process seems
the product of a political malfunction whether passed by kindly legislators who, wishing to stay in office to do good on other subjects, reluctantly voted for it, or by voting automatons simply serving as
conduits for the desires of their constituents, or by racist legislators
venting their own hatred and racial stereotypes. We might view some
of these legislators as better or worse people. But their personal attractiveness is not the primary issue. The issue is or ought to be the
chance that a group will be seriously underrepresented in the political
process as a whole.
Hateful legislators whose desires run counter to the forces of influence within the political system are likely to be controlled by that sys-
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tern itself. On the other hand, if systemic forces create a strong
tendency toward either of the malfunctions we have identified, the
presence of hateful legislators is only a convenience. Recall that we
are building conceptions of political malfunction in order to aid in the
difficult decision of how to allocate the scarce resource of judicial review. The conceptions we construct should emphasize those elements
which will be least likely to be corrected within the political process.
In my view, those elements are systemic. 44
Another set of constitutional theories of judicial review also focuses on the mental states of government officials. The authors of
these theories stress the failure of government officials to concern
themselves about values higher than individual private interest.
Phrases like "deliberation" and "civic virtue" permeate these theories.
Cass Sunstein's theory of the judicial role in public law is the most
developed of these theories. 45 In Sunstein's view, political malfunction, and therefore the judicial role, are defined by the failure of legislators to go beyond selfish concerns - theirs or those of their
constituents - to deliberation of a higher public interest. Sunstein
argues that his theory most closely captures the views of James
Madison. We will address that argument subsequently.46 But, taken
on its own, Sunstein's basic institutional analysis suffers from the same
problems as Ely's, in addition to problems inherent in the vision of
judges as the determiners of general principles or the searchers for
morality or moral evolution.
Governmental failure to deliberate seems an unworkable sufficient
condition for judicial review. Very little governmental action is the
product of removed, neutral, public-interest deliberation. Failure of
these conditions would suggest that virtually all such actions would be
candidates for serious judicial scrutiny. Such a situation would
grossly violate even the weakest requirements of institutional allocation under our Constitution.47
Failure of deliberation also fails as a necessary condition. Deliberative, neutral decisionmaking is one of those attractive images that
pervades constitutional scholarship. Government officials in careful
thought may seem unbiased and trustworthy when envisioned in isolation. But societal decisionmaking never leaves these officials isolated.
Deliberation and severe political malfunction are compatible.
44. We will discuss the Supreme Court's use of a test like that proposed by Ely after we have
examined judicial limitations more closely. See Part IIl.B.2 infra.
45. Sunstein, supra note 2.
46. See Part II.D infra.
47. See Part I supra.
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Well intentioned, high-minded government officials can easily be
the instruments of severe political malfunction in a context which distorts what they see and understand or which distorts their decisions in
aggregation with others. The complexity and size of society make
each government official dependent on others in society for information, wisdom, and aid in shouldering the responsibility of decisionmaking. This interdependence operates in a wide variety of channels
or processes. Some views are overrepresented in these processes and,
therefore, in the perceptions of these officials. Honest administrators
who hear only the views of organized special interests may believe they
are deliberating the public interest. Other views are absent and, therefore, unavailable to correct misconceptions or otherwise discipline
these officials. In such a context, legislators who believe that women
should be protected from the evils of the marketplace or that blacks
are better suited for trade schools or that citizens should be preferred
over aliens for government jobs may be honestly deliberating the public interest. The recent Iran-Contra affair has shown that severe
problems can exist even when government officials operate according
to zealously maintained visions of the public interest. Malfunctions lie
in the general political process, not the mindset of the governmental
actors. 48
Deliberation and its relationship to a higher sense of citizenship
form an important theme in recent scholarship. 49 The rejection of selfinterested preference as the sole basis of societal decisionmaking has
strong intuitive appeal. But as the foregoing analysis shows, the way
these commentators employ this notion has severe analytical
problems. Although constitutional commentators are impressively eloquent in their rejection of selfish preference, they are disturbingly
mute about alternative conceptions.
Paradoxically, rather than articulate an alternative conception of
societal good, these commentators attempt to sidestep the task with
simplistic institutional arguments which equate a societal decisionmaker or a trait of decisionmaking with the existence of these
otherwise undefined conceptions of societal good. Sunstein's reliance
on deliberation is an example. It is certainly not the only or the most
48. It is Sunstein's position that Madison hoped that removal of national legislators from
local majorities by distance and, to some degree, by indirect election would produce the opportunity for contemplation of a higher good. As the subsequent discussion of the framing of the
original Constitution will show, there are reasons to doubt Sunstein's perception of Madison's
position. As we shall see, even if Sunstein is correct about Madison, the resulting removal of
national legislators from local majorities is likely to substitute one bias or distortion of influence
for another.
49. See Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986), for
a good presentation of the various positions on civic virtue.
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fragile example. 50 But, as the analysis of Sunstein's position shows,
simplistic institutional arguments, especially those which ignore sys50. A classic example of a futile attempt to associate philosophical position and institutional
outcome is found in the approach of David A.J. Richards and Ronald Dworkin. See, Richards,
Human Rights as the Unwritten Constitution: The Problem of Change and Stability in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 u. DAYrON L. REv. 295 (1979); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 90-94, 188-92 (1977). Their logic operates as follows. The legislature is clearly the
utilitarian determiner (the proposition is considered so obvious that no argument is offered). On
this basis, rights which operate to invalidate legislation show the existence of strong anti-utilitarian principles in our Constitution. Further, since the legislature is utilitarian, it cannot check its
own process against anti-utilitarian constructs. This must be done by the judiciary. Thus, the
authors prove both the existence of anti-utilitarian principles and the role of the judiciary in
protecting them.
The argument that utilitarianism is associated with the political process while anti-utilitarianism is associated with the judiciary is fatally simplistic. The majoritarian political process is
hardly a perfect determiner of utilitarian outcomes; the analogous consideration of representation of citizen desires presented here shows that. A utilitarian Constitution would not necessarily
allocate decisionmaking to the legislature, or indeed form that legislature in the most directly
democratic manner. It is easy to conceive of trumps on the legislature in a utilitarian system.
Therefore, the existence of such trumps does not indicate the existence of anti-utilitarian elements. In some instances courts removed from the political process may be superior determiners
of the utilitarian good.
Nor is it by any means clear that the superior determiner of the anti-utilitarian ideal (or
ideals) is the judiciary rather than the legislature or the executive, let alone whether we would
prefer the federal or state judiciaries, legislatures, or executives or how these various institutions
should be designed or structured. Even if we were to assume Dworkin's and Richards's first
argument, that the legislature is always the superior determiner of utilitarianism, it does not
mean that the legislature is not also the superior determiner of anti-utilitarianism. To be superior
in one vein does not make the entity inferior in another.
To go further one would have to specify how nonutilitarian principles are designated and
protected. Anti-utilitarians often assign the judiciary this role because the judiciary is considered
the most deliberative or contemplative branch. Even assuming these traits, why should we assume that they are essential in the designation and protection of nonutilitarian principles? The
relevance of deliberation is supported, if at all, by analogy to personal search for principles higher
than self-interest. These arguments confuse aggregate (societal) and personal (individual) decisionmaking. The modes by which we attain the higher good in a large society may be quite
different from the manner in which we search for that good on a personal level. There are good
reasons to believe that on the societal level this search is usually (but not always) better accomplished by the less deliberative political process than by the more deliberative judiciary. See Back
to the Future, supra note 8, at 210-16.
Nor are arguments about the inability of the legislature to police itself helpful. These are
simply arguments for institutional allocation by default, which cannot hold up in a sophisticated
institutional analysis. Allocation by default is a common institutional argument made by constitutional scholars. In one fashion or another, problems with the political process are revealed and
the judiciary swept into place by the assertion that since they are the only entity outside this
defective political process they must be the determiner. But such arguments are flawed.
The legislative process is not monolithic. It does not fit the image of the evil individual who
would hardly be likely to police himself or herself. There are millions of individuals - and
numerous interests, positions, and factions - operating within the process. These positions operate to balance and control each other. The degree and form of this internal control varies over
time. As we have seen, this is the mechanism of control on which we rely in most instances. I
would hardly argue that this is the ideal, or more importantly, even the optimal means of policing in all instances. But it cannot be dismissed a priori. Institutional allocation cannot be determined simply by a bromide like "one can't police oneself." In a complex institutional setting in
which all institutions are highly constrained and imperfect, the defects in one process do not
validate allocation to an alternative. These defects may be necessary conditions, but they are far
from sufficient ones.
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temic elements, are insufficient as institutional analyses let alone as
definitions of the public good.
The proponents of the anti-preference position must do more than
assert the need for more than preferences. They must articulate these
principles and carefully consider their relationship to that complex allocation of decisionmaking which is constitutional law. There is no
simple correspondence between a sophisticated definition of the public
good and a specific allocation of societal decisionmaking. Basic institutional choices like the definition and role of the legislature, executive, or judiciary and indeed the very nature of government are not
self-evident from a given definition of the public good or vice versa.
There is a subtle, iterative relationship between institutional choice
and the choice of the public good. Clearly institutional choice or analysis is dependent on the definition of the public good which these
choices are meant to serve. On the other hand, conceptions of the
public good have little meaning without some sense of how they will
be achieved. A conception of the public good which cannot come into
being makes little sense.
What we mean by the public good is often conditioned by our assumptions or beliefs about how societal institutions function. Affection
for liberty or freedom and the definition of particular liberties or freedoms seem linked to particular fears of government misbehavior. The
civil or natural rights of a given age seem closely related to recent
histories of government misbehavior concerning these subjects. 51 The
more sophisticated we are about institutional behavior and those factors which cause it, the more sophisticated we will be about our notions of the public good and, in particular, our sense of which values
or freedoms we wish to emphasize in which contexts. In tum, a betterdeveloped sense of what we want will aid us in institutional choice.
I have conceived of political malfunction in terms of significant
and systemic failure to represent the interests of the populace partly
because respect for citizen interests ought to be a central component of
any measure of the public good. It troubles me that it is an incomplete
measure and one which disturbs many, yet I am handicapped by the
lack of adequately articulated alternative conceptions.
I believe, however, that the analysis of institutional behavior
presented here, with its emphasis on simultaneous comparison of insti51. For example, the natural rights emphasized in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century American jurisprudence, such as the right to sell or control one's labor or property, see, e.g.,
Justice Bushrod Washington's often-quoted list of "fundamental rights" in Corfield v. Coryell, 6
F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230), followed a period of royal manipulation and suppression
of such activity in England and the colonies. See c. HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION,
1603-1714 (1961).
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tutions and systemic considerations, provides insights which are applicable across any conception of the public good. Even the more
particularized notions of majoritarian and minoritarian bias presented
here are likely to have broad application. Indeed, given the rough approximations and tendencies which characterize this stage of my analysis, I would guess that the constructs and insights presented here
would be relevant given any sensible alteration in the underlying conception of the public good. 52
This proposition will be tested to some degree by the applications
in this article. It can be tested further if constitutional commentators
will give institutional choice and institutional analysis the attention
they deserve. It is the importance of institutional analysis, not the
validity of any particular conception of the public good, which concerns me. We can begin to explore the validity of the conceptions of
political malfunction set out here by examining how well they aid us in
understanding the framing of the original Constitution.

D. The Polar Models: A Look at the Framing
of the Original Constitution

Concerns about both majoritarian and minoritarian bias have
played a central role throughout our constitutional history, 53 particu52. It must also be remembered that the representation of citizen interests (or its failure) is
used to define political malfunction and, therefore, to define an important condition for judicial
intervention. But it does not necessarily define how the judiciary should resolve those issues
which, because of this malfunction, the judiciary ought to consider reviewing and remaking. I
am not suggesting that judges resolve societal issues solely on the basis of citizen interests. In
reality, the character of judicial decisionmaking makes it unlikely that the courts would ever be a
very good instrument to poll the citizenry. In instances of severe political malfunction, they
might be better than the political process, but that's not saying much.
Courts will ultimately resolve these issues in a manner which is difficult to specify. As we
shall see, judges must continuously reconsider various institutional factors like resource limitations, subject-matter expertise, and comparative biases which do not disappear when the courts
make the first rough determination that they might take over an area of societal decisionmaking.
Ultimately, however, there comes a point in the remaking of these societal decisions when judges
must turn to those musings that constitute individual human decisionmaking, whether they are
called contemplation, deliberation, intuition, tradition, or just plain guessing. Presumably, these
musings will respect citizen interests, desires, and preferences, but they are likely to reflect other
concerns as well.
53. Fears of minoritarian bias can be seen in the Jacksonian era, which laid heavy emphasis
on concerns about the role of special interests. See, e.g., M. MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION (1960). This trend continued into the post-Civil War period, manifested directly in
constitutional positions like that of Justice Field, who sought an expansive reading of the fourteenth amendment in response to his perception of the undue influence of small organized forces
at the state and local level. See McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of GovernmentBusiness Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM.
HIST. 970, 976-77, 981 (1975).
On the other hand, one can see the emphasis on majoritarian bias in Carolene Products both the footnote and the case. In the case, the Court rejected a significant role for the judiciary
in reviewing economic regulatory legislation despite the potential of minoritarian bias; in the
footnote, the Court asserted a strong concern about the protection of minorities. 308 U.S. 144,
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lady in the framing and ratification of the original Constitution. This
period shows clear concern about both these forms of bias. In fact, the
two opposing constitutional positions of the time - the Federalists
and Anti-Federalists - can be traced through the differences in their
concerns about majoritarian as opposed to minoritarian bias.
Recent work on the period between the Declaration of Independence and the Constitutional Convention suggests a gradual change in
perceptions about the dangers of government. Political thinking at the
time of the Revolution placed heavy emphasis on the excesses of the
monarchy and the royal governors. There was an accompanying great
faith in the legislature and the associated broader-based franchise.s 4
These early American perceptions paralleled the English experience,
where hostility to royal grants of special favors to a privileged few
produced seventeenth century constitutional reforms increasing the
role of Parliament. ss By the time of the framing of the Constitution,
however, the greaLfaith in the legislature had waned in substantial
part because of the perceived excesses of post-Revolutionary legislative
majorities. The potential for excesses by both executive and legislative
branches raised concerns about the excesses of both the few and the
many - concerns about the undue influence of both minorities and
majorities. s6 The degree of concern about one or the other of these
influences, however, varied significantly between proponents and opponents of the proposed Constitution.
The Framers, or at least those who authored the Federalist papers,
recognized the existence of both forms of bias, expressed concern
about both, but seemed to worry most about majorities. James
Madison in particular placed great emphasis on the dangers of the
majority:
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the
152 n.4 (1938). The Warren Court will be remembered best for its decisions protecting tradi·
tional minorities. At the same time, that Court radically de-emphasized judicial review of eco·
nomic regulation even when there were clear indications of strong special interest influence. See,
e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding state statute prohibiting
opticians from providing eyeglasses without a prescription from an optometrist or opthamolo·
gist); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding state statute restricting "business of
debt adjusting" to lawyers).
In analyses of modem America, many social scientists place great emphasis on minoritarian
bias, whether in the form of the economist's theories of regulation or the political scientist's
concepts of special interest legislation or agency capture. See, e.g., Stigler, The Theory of Eco·
nomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971); M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSI·
NESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955); THE PoLmcs OF REGULATION (J. Wilson ed.
1980); B. MITNICK, THE PoLmCAL EcoNOMY OF REGULATION (1980).
54. See, e.g., G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
55. See C. HILL, supra note 51.
56. See G. WOOD, supra note 54, at 135, 237-44; D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF
THE FEDERALIST 131 (1984).
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republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister
views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse
the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under
the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction,
the form of popular Government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of
other citizens. . . .
... [T]he majority ... must be rendered, by their number and local
situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of
oppression. . . .
... [A] pure Democracy, by which I mean a Society consisting of a
small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the Government
in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. 57

And also:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of
oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of
the community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of
the major number of the Constituents. This is a truth of great importance, but not yet sufficiently attended to . . . .58

These comments reveal two other elements of importance. They
emphasize the systemic nature of political malfunction. Madison's
analysis is not based on the mindset of public officials. Majorities are
most to be feared because they are least likely to have their influence
checked within the larger political system. Whether or not Madison's
view that majorities were most to be feared is correct, his argument
reflects a sophisticated perception of the systemic nature of political
malfunction.
Madison's comments also reveal the major Federalist response to
this perceived danger: the removal or insulation of federal government decisionmakers from local populations. They sought this insulation in several ways. First, these decisionmakers were physically
distanced. The national capital was generally much further from most
citizens than the seat of state or local governments; physical distance
was no small factor at a time when travel was so difficult. Second,
each of these decisionmakers was to represent a large number of constituents, thereby making organization of a majority more difficult.
Third, they served for relatively long terms ranging from two to six
years. As such, their constituents had far less frequent access through
the ballot box and a more complex ,record to decipher and judge.
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 59-60 (J. Madison) (H. Dawson ed. 1863).
58. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in THE MIND
OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE PoLmCAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 206 (M. Meyers ed. 1973) (emphasis in original).
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Fourth, the Senate and President were indirectly elected - the Senate
by state legislatures and the President by the electoral college. 59
The Federalists were not opposed to popular government. They
gave us a Constitution with elective offices and finite terms of service.
No government officials held office by right of birth and all, except the
judges, faced periodic reelection either by direct vote of the populace
or by bodies whose members were themselves subject to periodic election. 60 But there can be no doubt that pure majoritarian government
was not what the Federalists wanted. They were very concerned
about protection against what they perceived as the excesses of the
majority.
Their opponents, the more heterogeneous Anti-Federalists, 61 appear far more concerned about minoritarian bias than the Federalists.
The Anti-Federalists feared that indirectly elected Senators serving
long terms would devolve into an aristocracy and combine with the
indirectly elected President to allow an easy conduit for "the advantage of the few ... over the many." 62 In response, they sought rotation in office, shorter terms, the possibility of recall, and easier
impeachment. 63 They also feared that the House was insufficiently numerous to enable it to be "a representation of the people" and, therefore, would be subject to influence and corruption. 64 They feared "the
superior opportunities for organized voting which they felt to be inherent in the more thickly populated areas." 65 They feared that a
Supreme Court not subject to popular control would favor the rich. 66
As we have seen, these are all signs of concern about minoritarian bias.
59. See D. EPSTEIN, supra note 56, at 59, 95-97, 99-100, 105.
60. Madison, in particular, opposed the election of the Senate by state legislatures and any
attempt to seek a "mixed" government such as the English parliamentary monarchy. Id. at 12223.
61. "[T]he Antifederalists were far from united in their political ideas." J. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 119 (1961); see Wood, The Worthy Against the Licentious, in CONFEDERATION
AND THE CONSTITUTION 86 (G. Wood ed. 1973).
62. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADEL·
PHIA, IN 1787, at 493-94 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES] (comments of George Mason). See also id. at 503-04 (comments of Patrick Henry); id. at 220 (comments of James
Monroe).
63. See id. at 50 (comments of Patrick Henry). See also note 62 supra and materials cited
therein.
64. Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 380 (H. Storing ed. 1981)
(essay of Nov. 15, 1787); see also Letters of Centine/, in id. at 142 (letter I); Letters from tlte
Federal Farmer, in id. at 235 (letter of Oct. 10, 1787); 2 DEBATES, supra note 62, at 248-49
(comments of Melancton Smith); 3 id. at 281-82 (comments of William Grayson).
65. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 13 (1955).
66. See Essays ofBrutus, supra note 64, at 438-39 (essay of Mar. 20, 1788); 1 DEBATES, supra
note 62, at 495 (comments of George Mason).
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This tension between the Federalist and Anti-Federalist positions
centered on the controversy over the relative roles of larger versus
smaller jurisdictions - in particular, the role of the state versus the
national government. As we have seen, Madison feared the power of
the majority more than that of the minority. He saw the answer in a
stronger national government as well as the indirect election of government officials. The Anti-Federalists believed in small jurisdictions
and feared that, as governments grew larger and more remote, the
concentrated few would subvert the process.
From an institutional perspective, it is easy to understand the importance given jurisdictional size by those who debated the original
Constitution. The factors we have already discussed coalesce here.
Smaller jurisdictions tend to decrease the costs of organization, acquisition of information, and access to political influence. At the simplest
level, local officials are physically more accessible. They live among
their constituents and the official locus of decisionmaking is within the
locale. Unlike members of Congress, local and even state representatives have their primary residences in the locale they represent; state
capitals are, in most instances, far more accessible than is Washington,
D.C. The legislatures of smaller jurisdictions tend to be smaller and to
operate on fewer issues. State and local officials tend to serve shorter
terms than their federal counterparts. Shorter terms and simpler
agendas make it easier to understand and evaluate the actions of these
officials. Easier understanding means less need for investment in information and less need for the organization which goes with it. Smaller
populations mean fewer people to inform and fewer people to organize
for effective political action. As a general matter, smaller jurisdictions
tend to be more homogeneous. As such, it is easier to identify the
views shared by the majority. Ease of identification and similarity in
views simplifies organization and communication.
Both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists understood the connections between size of jurisdiction and political response; they had different views on the results. To the Federalists, politically active local
majorities were the problem and a more complex, indirect national
government was the answer. To the Anti-Federalists, the opposite was
true. These two very different views of jurisdictional size envision very
different trade-offs between majoritarian and minoritarian bias. 67
The Federalist and Anti-Federalist positions both possess itiade67. Important technological changes may have altered the association between size of jurisdiction and form of bias which characterized the views of those who debated the original Constitution. Vastly improved transportation has made the national capital far more accessible. More
important, the growth of a national news media makes the happenings in Washington far more
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quacies and inconsistencies. Anti-Federalists can be seen as the heirs
to the classical republican tradition. They envisioned a republic small
in size with a small and homogeneous population. 68 The great problem for the Anti-Federalists was the extrapolation of republican ideals
to a large, dispersed, and heterogeneous population. They did not
have an alternative for a national government. 69
For the Federalists, whose affirmative program was more directly
embodied in the Constitution, the problems are more subtle and yet
more important. Madison and the Federalists stressed government on
a larger scale with political decisionmakers (legislators and executives)
removed from the mass of the populace both by distance and by mode
of selection. The analysis of political malfunction employed here suggests that, to the extent that the Federalist structure achieved the insulation of officials from the general populace, it traded one bias for
another.
Greater distance, more complex modes of selection, and larger and
more diverse constituencies provide protection of public officials from
the masses - but not complete isolation. Other paths of influence,
and therefore sources of bias, remain and in fact flourish. The more
complex setting enhances the power of organization and the accumulation of funds while it helps conceal underhanded dealings. Isolation
provides respite from the masses but not from concentrated minorities.
In other words, removal may purchase protection from majoritarian
bias by increasing the potential for minoritarian bias.
This trade-off is an important reality which we will consider
throughout the article. The Anti-Federalists seemed to understand
the trade-off. In my view, Madison and the other Federalists also recognized this trade-off and chose what they considered the lesser evil.
Cass Sunstein's view is different.
accessible to citizens throughout the nation. There may in fact be more information available
through the media about the national government than about state or local governments.
These shifts are countered by other changes in two hundred years. The nation has grown in
size and population. That population is far more heterogeneous, especially at the national level.
The scope and complexity of societal issues, especially those decided at the national level, has
grown. These changes will be considered as we work our way through modern constitutional
law.
68. See Michelman, supra note 49, at 19; Essays of Brutus, supra note 64, at 109-13; Wood,
supra note 61, at 97; 1 DEBATES, supra note 62, at 481 (letter from Yates and Lansing); Letters
from the Federal Farmer, supra note 64, at 230; Kenyon, supra note 65, at 6-8. They apparently
envisioned an exchange of ideas which allows the populace to recognize and support a public
good greater than any narrower self-interest with which members of that populace might have
begun. They feared that this exchange would not occur in larger, more heterogeneous populations. Wood, supra note 61, at 97; Letters ofCentinel. supra note 64, at 141; id. at 56.
69. The same problem remains for those who today wish to resurrect these republican ideals.
See Michelman, supra note 49, at 17-55. What institutional form will organize a society which
today is far larger and more heterogeneous than it was in 1787?
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Sunstein believes that Madison's attempt to remove federal legislators from the pressures of local majorities was motivated by a desire to
secure greater opportunity for legislative deliberation in the service of
a public good beyond preferences.70 He points to Madison's desire for
a legislature made up of "a chosen body of citizens ... whose patriotism and love of justice" would lead them to serve as "enlightened
statesmen." 71 Whatever Madison's desires, however, he apparently
did not hold out much hope that such a legislature would result from
the structures established in the Constitution. David Epstein, whose
extensive examination of the Federalist position Sunstein uses to support his own view of Madison, finds a significant gap between
Madison's desires and his perception of reality. 72 There is a conflict
between Madison's vision of the outcome of a system which would
check the power of any single faction by pitting one faction against
another and the ascendancy to office of "enlightened statesmen" with
a neutral view. 73 Madison may have hoped for the ascendancy of noble
spirits but he apparently expected and planned for far more mortal
ones.
Sunstein portrays Madison as believing that decisionmakers, cut
loose from the pressures of the majority, would somehow be free from
other influences and transcend private interests. It seems unlikely that
Madison was unsophisticated enough to believe that deliberation
about the public interest is the likely result of removing government
officials from majoritarian political pressure. If that was his belief, it
would be a particularly poor piece of Madison's analysis upon which
to build a modern theory.
Madison and the Federalists were not necessarily wrong to emphasize the need to address majoritarian over minoritarian bias. The correct choice depends on a number of factors, such as size of the
jurisdiction or complexity of the issues, which may make one or the
other bias more likely. As the analysis develops, we will find concerns
about both forms of political malfunction throughout constitutional
law. The polar models are powerful precisely because neither is always appropriate.
Analysis of these malfunctions plays a role in a larger analytical
framework. Whether one or the other form of political malfunction is
somehow more pernicious or prevalent cannot be considered in the
70. See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
71. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 41, 43 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58, 60 (J.
Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898)).
72. D. EPSTEIN, supra note 56, at 87-88, 97-100, 138-41, 150-53.
73. Id. at 108-09.
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abstract. The efficacy of judicial review depends on the characteristics
of the reviewer as well as those of the reviewed. In this scheme, the
proper judicial role is a match between the potential political malfunction and the potential for judicial response. The rest of this article
explores this match by examining judicial response and its variation in
form and effectiveness across the two forms of political malfunction.

III.

THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE

Having provided an overview of societal decisionmaking dominated by the political process, and divided the malfunctions of the
political process into two polar forms, we now seek to identify when
and how the judiciary responds to these malfunctions. The first section of this Part suggests some working hypotheses about judicial limitations and capacities. The second section categorizes and examines
the judicial response to the political malfunctions we have thus far
discussed.
A.
1.

Judicial Constraints and Capacities

Limited Resources and the Cost of Judicial Response

Identification of political malfunction - a severe systemic underrepresentation of a given interest - is only a first step in defining the
dimensions of judicial review. The identification of a political malfunction does not automatically mean that the resulting government
action is invalid. It means only that the governmental determination
is biased and it identifies the direction of the bias. The presence of
such a bias does not necessarily mean that the same decision would
not have been made by an unbiased process.
Thus, for example, the congressional restriction on the interstate
sale of filled milk, at issue in Carolene Products, may well have been
the product of a Congress subject to severe minoritarian bias. The
interests of the dairy industry may have been overrepresented relative
to that of the dispersed majority of consumers. But, an unbiased Congress in which consumer interests were adequately represented might
also have passed the restriction, based perhaps on the offsetting benefits to consumer safety.
Severe bias provides grounds to distrust the determination of the
political process. The more severe the bias, the greater the distrust.
But courts cannot act on this distrust without remaking the underlying societal decision. Despite continuing claims by judges that they do
not make legislative decisions or social policy, that is precisely what
judicial review (no matter how it is defined) requires them to do. As
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such, the judiciary's ability to resolve the underlying societal decision
becomes relevant.
We have emphasized the severely limited resources of the judiciary, especially relative to the ever-growing number of government actions potentially subject to review. 74 The resource costs of judicial
review, which can vary substantially from one subject matter to another, affect not only the amount but also the form of judicial review.
These costs depend on the ease with which courts can distinguish
valid from invalid governmental activity, and their ability to formulate
and articulate a corresponding clear test. Clear tests mean fewer cases
brought, litigated, and appealed, and therefore a smaller burden on the
judiciary. Such clarity, however, involves a degree of arbitrariness or,
more gently, generalization, which risks invalidating good legislation
or accepting bad. The chances as well as the costs of such an error
vary with the subject matter of the legislation under review. Some
subject matter - like foreign affairs - may be so complex and sensitive that sweeping rules could be established only at unacceptable
costs. 75 In general, the more rigid the rule the greater the pressure to
allow qualifications which make the rule dependent on a wider variety
of circumstances, eventually evolving into a more flexible standard.
The price for this flexibility is a larger continuing role for the
judiciary.
This interaction between resource costs, risks of error, and the potential for sweeping solutions determines the price tag for judicial review of a given area of government activity. This price tag cannot help
but influence the selection of areas for judicial review as well as the
form of that review. 76 From this perspective, for example, the price
tag of judicial review in the era of economic due process, high at the
outset, grew much higher as limiting strategies failed and the govern74. See Part I supra.
75. In a creative analysis of the political question doctrine, Fritz Scharpf argued that subjects
like foreign affairs were so difficult for the courts that the sweeping solution of abstention was the
paramount response. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis,
75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966). Even after twenty years, Scharpf's thoughtful analysis provides useful
insights into the meaning and scope of judicial ability. Scharpf's general theory is examined
extensively in Taking Institutions Seriously, supra note 8, at 381-84.
76. It will no doubt disturb some proponents of judicial review that I am treating a hallowed
subject in terms of limits and resources. No doubt any discussion of constraints on the capacity
of the judiciary is speculative and intellectually treacherous. But such constraints do exist and
they are sufficiently important to demand attention. Proponents of judicial review would be
unwise to ignore these constraints in their analyses and arguments. Failure to consider these
factors leaves this central issue to their opponents. More important, without an appreciation of
the role of such factors, these analysts will not understand the judicial responses they observe and
they will not be able to influence the judiciary to be more ambitious and productive with their
resources.
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ment activity increased. The courts had real difficulty developing a
simple and efficient strategy which would discern valid from invalid
government action. In Lochner v. New York, 77 an early instance of
judicial invalidation of legislation under economic due process, the
Court qualified the newly established freedom of contract allowing
government to regulate when there were serious health and safety impacts on third parties, or where there was serious need to protect one
of the contracting parties who did not have the mental capacity to
contract, or where the contract was the product of a monopoly situation. Anyone familiar with modern welfare economics can understand
that these standard grounds for government intervention are both
amorphous and pervasive.
The courts could not simply invalidate all government regulation
of commerce. Such a simple and sweeping solution ran too great a
risk of invalidating valid legislation. But the vague standards of Lochner presented the courts with a sizable potential for review and, therefore, an open-ended invitation to remake important and difficult
societal decisions. The courts evolved a series of constructs meant to
separate valid and invalid regulations. These constructs created a
hodgepodge of judicial decisions filled with inconsistent twists and
turns, undefined concepts, and enough uncertainty to allow legislation
seemingly declared invalid to remain in effect. 78 As the output and
77. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
78. In Lochner itself, 198 U.S. at 45, the Court invalidated maximum-hour legislation in the
baking industry although it had shortly before approved such legislation with respect to the
mining industry. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 396-97 (1898). Within a few years, it made an
exception to the invalidity of maximum-hour legislation for instances where it applied particularly to women. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908). Not much later, the Court
allowed maximum-hour legislation virtually across the board without even noting that it was
overruling Lochner. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 437-39 (1917).
Over the same period the Court's decisions on the related subject of the validity of minimumwage legislation showed the opposite progression. The Court had upheld federal minimum-wage
legislation in 1917, Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 359 (1917); upheld state minimum-wage legislation in 1917, Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917) (per curiam), ajfg. by an equally divided
court 69 Or. 519, 139 P. 743 and 70 Or. 261, 141 P. 158; invalidated federal minimum-wage
legislation in 1923, Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560-62 (1923), and appeared to do
the same for state legislation under the authority of Adkins in 1925 and 1927. Donham v. WestNelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927) (per curiam); Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925) (per
curiam).
The trend for the Court's treatment of minimum-wage legislation was not only inconsistent
with the pattern of maximum-hour cases, it was also confusing. When, in 1937, the Court finally
upheld minimum-wage laws (after apparently invalidating a similar law the previous year in
Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936)), the Washington statute it
upheld had been in existence for twenty-three years. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379, 390 (1937).
During the entire era, the Court limited regulation of prices and rates to businesses "affected
with a public interest." From its inception in the pre-Lochner case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 125-26, 133-35 (1877), to its death nearly sixty years later in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 536-39 (1934), this central concept remained a mystery. The Court flirted with the idea of
monopoly as a defining element, but it did not consistently adhere to this criterion. See Nebbia,
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complexity of governmental regulation increased in the 1930s, the
costs of court involvement also increased. Although many factors
may have contributed to the retreat from economic due process which
occurred, the sizable and increasing price tag for judicial involvement
and the failure of judicial strategies to control these rising costs pushed
relentlessly in that direction.
These costs and the courts' ability to find tractable solutions which
lessen them only reveal one aspect of the question of judicial review.
The analysis is comparative and the choice of whether to review is or
should be a balance of these costs with the benefits of judicial review.
As we have seen, these benefits are related to the severity of political
malfunction. More severe political malfunctions justify greater outlays of judicial resources and greater temerity by judges. But even if
they are not the sole determiners of judicial review, costs and tractability cannot be ignored. The courts' resources are limited and the demands on these resources grow more severe. 79 The understandable
struggle to use these resources wisely creates pressure to resolve issues
with the least cost possible.
We see indications of this desire for dispatch and resolution in the
Supreme Court's remedy in the controversial abortion decision, Roe v.
Wade. 80 There, the Court was faced with a wide variety of abortion
regulations and prohibitions. Although concluding that the sweeping
solution of wholesale invalidation of all regulations and prohibitions
was untenable, the Court nevertheless did not confine itself to invalidating the particular state anti-abortion law or simply to acknowledging that there might be instances in which the state's interests could
justify regulation. Instead it set out, in detail, the circumstances in
which the state might regulate or prohibit abortions; it divided the
period of pregnancy neatly into thirds and defined the specific state
responses allowed in each successive twelve-week period.
Arbitrary elements abound. When one considers the large variety
of potential regulations; the wide variation in health conditions with
291 U.S. at 538. The test was adopted in Munn, virtually abandoned in Brass v. North Dakota
ex rel. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391, 402·04 (1894), questioned in Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S.
235, 239-40 (1929), and briefly resurrected in Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S.
420, 438-39 (1930). For a time, the Court also spoke of a business's impact on the general public,
see Munn, 94 U.S. at 126, but it eventually abandoned this unwieldy concept, see Tyson &
Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 430 (1927). The Court found itself regularly admitting that the
"public interest" test was difficult to explain and apply, see, e.g., Tyson, 273 U.S. at 430; Ribnik
v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 355 (1928), but it kept trying to employ it. Finally, in Nebbia, the
Court conceded that there could be no "closed class" of businesses "affected with a public interest"; all businesses of any importance affect the public. 291 U.S. at 536.
79. See note 13 supra.
80. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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person, place, and time; and the ill-defined nature of the state's interest
in the fetus, the compartmentalization of interests into discrete twelveweek periods seems a very arbitrary way to balance the relevant interests. 81 In recent cases dissenters on the Court have chided the majority for not allowing a more flexible, if less specific, formulation. 82
The Roe formulation and the Court's unwillingness to increase its
flexibility seems consistent with a desire to reduce litigation even at the
expense of arbitrariness. Calls for a more reasonable and flexible review of abortion regulation come from dissenting judges who strongly
oppose court involvement in the abortion issue in general. Whatever
their views on the merits, the strategy they propose would increase the
costs of judicial activity in the area, and therefore increase the chances
that the Court would abandon the abortion question altogether. I believe that both the majority and the dissenters understand these implications. Given the demands on judicial resources inherent in the
uncharted right of privacy83 and the controversial issue of abortion, it
is hardly strange that the Court should choose to impose an arbitrary
system which roughly balances the needs of flexibility and the needs of
specificity.
In some areas of potential judicial involvement, sweeping solutions
are so inappropriate that the courts must choose between more expensive case-by-case review and abandonment of the area of review. The
high costs of particularized review may cause abandonment of judicial
involvement, as they arguably did with economic due process, or a
refusal to get involved, as they arguably did in the context of school
81. The concept of viability used by the Court to define the crucial third trimester in which
the states might prohibit abortions epitomizes the arbitrariness of this trimester system. The
Court did not derive this concept from any of the cultures or religions whose considerations of
the abortion issue the Court so laboriously rehearsed in its opinion. Viability is a technical con·
cept borrowed from medicine where it served purposes usually unrelated to questions of abor·
ti on.
The rationale for the division between the first and second trimester is less important but no
less arbitrary. It is basically a non sequitur. The Court ruled that the states had no special
interest in the health of the mother before the second trimester because for the first twelve weeks
the risk to the mother from terminating pregnancy was less than that from continuing it. But
prohibition of termination {abortion) was not in issue in the difference between the first and
second trimester. The issue was regulation of the abortion procedures, not prohibition of abortion. There was no a priori reason to believe that there were not more or less healthy ways of
aborting in the first twelve weeks which, under the holding, the state might prescribe.
The trimester system and the strange choice of viability have been criticized by many commentators. E.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J, 920
(1973); Lynn, Technology and Reproductive Rights: How Advances i11 Technology Ca11 Be Used
To Limit Women's Reproductive Rights, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 223 (1983).
82. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462
U.S. 416 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
83. We will discuss the right of privacy more fully at the text following note 138 i11fra.
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finance. 84 On the other hand, the importance of judicial involvement
may cause the courts to bear these costs as they have in the school
desegregation cases. In such instances, there are continuous pressures
to find broader-based strategies which increase tractability and decrease costs. 85
2.

Judicial Bias and Capacity

In addition to the costs of judicial decisionmaking, there are also
considerations of bias and judicial ability. As with the legislative or
administrative processes, we must consider the judicial process as a
whole and raise similar questions about representation and systemic
bias. 86 The dominant structural characteristic of the judiciary is its
removal and insulation from direct political pressures: federal judges
are appointed for life. Earlier, I argued that the insulation of federal
legislators which Madison and the Federalists used to combat
majoritarian bias traded majoritarian for minoritarian bias. Is the
same true for the even greater insulation accorded the federal
judiciary?
Minoritarian bias operates in a number of ways in the political process, including graft, prospects of future employment, or campaign
contributions. Although the life tenure and ethos of federal judges
may make it unlikely that they could be influenced by such prospects,
84. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
85. The school desegregation area, in fact, has seen many innovative attempts to deal with
these pressures. See M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (1982).
86. As with analyses of political malfunction which focus on the characteristics oflegislators,
analyses of judicial malfunction which focus on the characteristics of judges are problematic.
For example, Paul Brest argues that judges are elitist and unrepresentative based on their demographic characteristics. Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1982). But
that judges are more elitist and less representative than elected officials does not follow from the
demographics of the most observable decisionmakers. Brest points out that there are few minorities or females and no nonlawyers on the federal bench. Id. at 771. Judges are also not poor; all
have incomes substantially above average. Id. But in this simple sense, Congress is even less
representative than the courts. Blacks make up 5% of the federal bench, but less than 4% of the
Congress (4.6% of the House; 0% of the Senate). Women make up over 8% of the federal
bench, but less than 5% of Congress (5% of the House and 2% of the Senate). The Supreme
Court has one black and one woman and, therefore, in terms of simple demographics, each group
has more than 10% membership. Most members of Congress are lawyers or business people and
their salaries are clearly above average.
It may be valid to argue that the judiciary is elitist or unrepresentative relative to the legislature. But those characteristics are the product of the character of the given institution not
demographics of judges and legislators. Whatever the characteristics of the legislators, they are
dependent on reelection to retain office. In this sense, they can be considered dependent upon
and, therefore, representative of populations which have different demographic characteristics
from theirs. These differences, however, need not always cut in the direction of less elitism or
broader representation. To the extent that the mechanism of minoritarian bias characterizes the
given political decision, the politically dominant part of the population may be less representative
of the general population than even the legislators themselves.
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influence can also occur through more subtle means, primarily
through the working of the adjudication process. The adjudication
process is an important source of information for judges. Their view
of the issues can be molded by what they are told and shown in the
cases brought to them. 87 Judges usually accumulate less specific information than administrators who have narrower jurisdictions or legislators who have independent staffs for investigation. The more complex
the issues and the less familiar the judges are with the given area, the
more likely that they can be influenced by the information provided by
the litigants.
From this perspective, the primary source of bias affecting the judiciary stems from the simple fact that it takes resources to litigate. The
amount spent on litigation, like that spent on lobbying, reflects the
ability to pool funds and, in tum, the size and distribution of the
stakes involved. As with lobbying, dispersed groups with lower per
capita impact face greater organizational needs and greater organizational costs than more concentrated interests.
Many cases will not be brought and others will be underfunded
where the interest is widely dispersed. One need only think of a dispute with $1,000,000 at stake and ask whether the likelihood of litigation and the quality of that litigation would vary as one saw that stake
concentrated on one individual, or dispersed among ten individuals, or
100 individuals and so on. Certainly, if it were divided evenly among
one million people, the chances of litigation would be very small. 88
Thus, although the form and perhaps the degree of minoritarian
bias may differ from that characterizing legislatures or administrative
agencies, the judiciary does tend toward minoritarian bias. 89 Certain
groups and interests will not be represented because they are dispersed. 90 Whether and to what extent the judicial process is less repre87. D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 38-39 (1977).
88. Devices like class actions may aid in reducing this bias. But, especially given the restric·
tions on such actions, the potential for correction is slight. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978).
89. Consider the following comments about the role of special interests in the evolution of
the common Jaw in this country:
Special interest prevailed over general interest, or prevailed at unfair cost to other special
interest, largely because legal processes did not provide that all relevant interests had adequate representation.... In policy making by litigation - in the making of common law there was the chronic danger that public policy of general import, or bearing heavily on
other particular interests, would be made in response to too narrow a record and too limited
a range of argument provided by the particular litigants to whom the precedent-making
lawsuit was open.
J. HURST, supra note 34, at 71.
90. The disadvantages of dispersed groups can also lead to problems with follow-up and
periodic review. Even if a coalition is organized to bring the initial litigation, it may be difficult
to hold it together to produce the additional litigation necessary to ensure enforcement and im-
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sentative than the political process depends on the context for
comparison. In some contexts, the biases of the judicial process may
be an advantage because of its match with the bias of the political
process. As I shall argue subsequently, this bias tends to make courts
a better match for majoritarian than minoritarian bias in the reviewed
entity.
Beyond issues of bias, the ability of judges to learn about and understand a given substantive area affects the tractability and costs of
judicial review of that area. This ability can vary widely among substantive areas. In the extreme, there are the traditional doubts about
judicial ability to understand and decide issues of foreign affairs and
national security. Here, questions about expertise, government control of information, secrecy, and significant (but often unassessable)
risks of judicial error induce judicial timidity. The political question
doctrine is the most extreme expression of this diffidence. 91
On a more general level, courts do not have the investigative resources available to most governmental processes. Judges do not generally have the luxury of specializing in a given area of social policy as
do many legislators. Judges are assigned cases of all sorts often on a
random basis. It would seem that the more complicated the social
policy question the more unattractive the judicial alternative.
In fact, viewed from one vantage point, courts are not good at anything - or at least at anything complex and important. In an oftencited study, 92 Donald Horowitz has presented a very critical picture of
judicial policymaking. As Horowitz sees them, courts receive information in a skewed and halting fashion, 93 misunderstand the social
contexts of the cases before them, 94 choose atypical cases as the vehicles for addressing social issues, 95 and generally lack the facilities, abilities, and propensities for enforcing, administering, and following up
on the cases they decide.
All this should give pause to those romantics who see in the courts
plementation. See generally D. HOROWITZ, supra note 87, at 51-56 (arguing that courts are not
equipped to monitor the effects of a decision after the litigation is concluded). The existence of
these problems are yet another reason why "sweeping solutions" and "creative arbitrariness" are
important. The more certain (if arbitrary) the principle and the remedy, the easier (and more
likely) its subsequent enforcement and implementation.
91. See Scharpf, supra note 75. The courts can, to a limited degree, postpone or delay decision until they can gather more information and increase their understanding. The most subtle
treatment of this creative use of delay is Alexander Bickel's notion of passive virtue. A. BICKEL,
supra note 17, at 111-98.
92. D. HOROWITZ, supra note 87.
93. Id. at 38-41.
94. Id. at 45-51, 260.
95. Id. at 266-68.
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a removed, platonic ideal capable of generally guiding society in its
moral evolution and search for neutral principles. Courts are highly
limited and potentially awkward decisionmakers. Advocates of judicial activism must address this reality in order to legitimate a significant judicial role.
But Horowitz's study can do no more than force us to accept the
reality of judicial imperfection. By its own terms it is not comparative,
and that is far more damning than Horowitz supposes. All societal
decisionmakers are highly imperfect. Were Horowitz to turn his critical eye to administrative agencies or legislatures he would no doubt
find problems with expertise, access to information, characterization
of issues, and follow-up. Careful studies would undoubtedly reveal important instances of awkwardness, error, and deleterious effect.
The relevance of technical expertise and investigative resources can
be understood only in terms of the incentives and pressures present in
the given process. The image of careful investigation and broad inquiry seems often ill-fitted to the actual goings-on in legislatures. Legislators are not technicians or scholarly investigators acquiring and
collecting social data and issuing learned and neutral reports. They
often ignore or manipulate technical information in line with the political pressures in the system.
Legislators are centrally concerned about the desires of their constituents (or at least those constituents who have clout). These needs
and desires are conveyed in threats of ouster, impassioned rallies,
shifting vote patterns, lobbying, and the other signals of political support or opposition to which a legislator with a finite term of office
listens so intently. What legislators hear through these processes affects how they react to the technical policy information they receive.
Under these circumstances, the greater technical fact-gathering ability
of the legislature may be relatively unimportant.
As a general matter, the ability to respond systematically to the
popular will is a major advantage of the political processes over the
judiciary. Where, however, political pressures provide a distorted picture of the public will with severe underrepresentation of parts of that
public, a process so strongly attached to those pressures may be at a
disadvantage relative to a more removed and insulated judicial
process.
Under the view presented in this article, the rare moments of judicial dominance only occur in instances of severe political malfunction.
This necessary condition severely limits the relevance of noncomparative considerations of judicial ability like that of Horowitz. Severe
limitations on judicial capability may sometimes mean that even se-
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vere political malfunctions will sometimes go unremedied because the
remedy is worse than the problem. But, in some instances, even an
awkward, myopic, error-prone judicial response may be superior to a
political process in the throes of serious malfunction.
What judges are good at may be relevant, but it is not decisive.
They must look first to where they are needed and seek out the most
severe examples of political malfunction. They will find many such
instances. They then must be conscious of what they can do in light of
these competing claims on their resources. Judges may well be called
upon to make societal decisions which, in the abstract, they are not
well-equipped to make. The comforts of procedural issues may have
to give way to the discomfort of less familiar subject matter - even
foreign affairs and national security.
B.

The Form of Response: The Match Between Political
Malfunction and Judicial Capability

We can now consider the balance between the severity of political
malfunction and the limits on the judiciary and, in tum, the judicial
responses to this balance. These responses are divided here into several categories, which are then associated with the two forms of political malfunction: minoritarian and majoritarian bias.
1.

Correcting the Process

John Ely has argued that many areas of judicial activity improve
the political process. He associates this aspect of judicial review with
the second paragraph of the Carolene Products footnote. 96 From this
vantage, voting rights and first amendment protection of speech, press,
and assembly improve the elective process and, therefore, subsequent
legislative and executive decisionmaking. These "process" notions
have played a central part in the judicial activism of the last forty to
fifty years. Even those generally most critical of this activism see the
first amendment and its protection of political speech and press as
valid grounds for judicial activity.9 7
From an institutional perspective, correction of malfunction has
obvious attraction. A judiciary severely constrained by its limited resources as well as doubts about its abilities must leave vast areas of
decisionmaking unattended, and struggle with whatever it does handle. If political malfunction can be reduced, fewer resources need be
96. See J. ELY, supra note 4, at 75-77.
97. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971).
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expended on review of the output of the corrected process. Similarly,
if a malfunction can be corrected, an area of political activity can be
ignored with less regret.
But to make each of these corrections, courts must resolve complex and difficult societal issues which have already been resolved by
the political process. If courts are to assure public access to information about government activity, for example, they must often consider
the implications of that access on such sensitive subjects as national
security and foreign affairs. 98 Although the corrective potential provides a significant added benefit which would and should attract the
courts, it is not a sufficient condition for judicial intervention. It is still
necessary to balance the relative abilities of the political and judicial
processes to resolve the basic substantive issues involved. The existence of the corrective potential may tip the balance where political
malfunction does not otherwise seem severe or the limitations on the
judiciary would otherwise appear daunting. But it is still the balance
of all of these factors considered together which is determinative.
That protection of political speech and the press help to correct
political malfunction explains why protection of speech and the press
is important, but not why judicial protection, as opposed to political
protection, is important. If the political process can adequately protect speech and press, judicial protection is not needed. Is there political malfunction associated with this protection? Ely suggests what he
calls the "in/out" bias: those in power wishing to stay in power suppress criticism in order to do so.
Such a conception of malfunction, although sensible at first glance,
misses the systemic nature of the political process by focusing only on
the most immediate actors - a tendency of Ely's which we saw earlier. 99 Those in office might like to do many things ranging from embezzlement of public funds to the exclusive use of government facilities
for themselves and their friends. Whether they can do so, however,
depends on the behavior of the political system as a whole. The "ins"
bias Ely suggests must be supplemented by some reason why the desire
of those in office to suppress criticism will not be countered within the
political process itself.
In some instances, suppression of political speech and press can
carry serious political consequences. Pervasive censorship might incur
the wrath of the powerful media - a source of information to the
dormant majority - or anger large numbers of citizens. Suppression
98. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Pentagon Papers case), is a
prime example. See text following note 101 infra.
99. See discussion of Ely's "motivation" theory of political malfunction in Part 11.B supra.
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of the views of the Democratic Party by a Republican Administration
seems a politically dangerous step which would be done infrequently
even without judicial protection.
But there are two quite different instances in which the political
process as a whole offers little threat to officeholders bent on suppressing expression. Not surprisingly they involve either majoritarian
or minoritarian bias. Censorship often suppresses unpopular political
messages rather than political messages immediately dangerous to the
political officeholders. It has been the Communist Party or some
other fringe group, not the Democratic or Republican Party, which
has most often been censored. In such instances, the "ins" do not feel
compelled to hide from the public their suppression of unwelcome expression. Here the political views of dissidents can be suppressed because the general public would not feel harmed - indeed they would
feel benefited. To the extent that this censorship benefits a low-impact
majority while iij.tensely harming a small minority, we again have the
conditions for majoritarian bias. 100
The presence of a low-impact majority also raises the distinct possibility of minoritarian bias. The public may be generally benefited by
the free exchange of ideas. But as with government regulation of the
market in goods and services - the classic examples of minoritarian
bias - each regulation has only a very small impact on a given individual. Such an individual has little incentive to investigate and understand the regulation in question and may even be convinced that
the regulation in question is beneficial. The detriment to citizens,
although small from any one regulation, is substantial when summed
over all regulations. Where a concentrated minority such as officeholders favors suppression of ideas, we have the conditions for severe
minoritarian bias. This minoritarian bias and the majoritarian bias
just discussed provide the systemic grounds for political malfunction
missing in Ely's "in/out" analysis.
Analyzing the judicial response to the protection of expression also
requires consideration of the costs of that protection. Constitutional
review of these regulations of expression is an imposing task. Regulation of expression confronts the courts with subject matter of varying
difficulty ranging from traffic control to national security and with restraints on expression of varying degrees ranging from complete suppression via prior restraints to limited controls on the manner of
delivering the message.
100. Majoritarian bias and first amendment protection of nonpolitical speech are discussed in
note 129 infra.
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Some cases severely test the ability of the courts. In the Pentagon
Papers case, 101 for example, the government claimed dire consequences for international relations, national security, and the execution of an ongoing (if undeclared) war unless publication of the
material in question was suppressed. Assessing such claims confronts
the courts with strains on their ability, a fact not lost on government
lawyers. The risks raised by the government's claims are both very
great and very difficult for the courts to gauge.
The Pentagon Papers case dramatically reveals the tensions created when severe suspicion of the political process shows up in the
same context as severe limitations on judicial ability. Although prior
restraint of political speech is traditionally the most suspect form of
constraint on expression, only three Justices declared governmental attempts at such suppression generally invalid. The remaining three majority Justices voted to invalidate the particular prior restraint
involved because of the absence of either a congressional statute or a
presidential regulation. As such, these three swing Justices were allowing the political processes to dictate those circumstances in which
the dangers to national security would be great enough to justify prior
restraint, in effect reallocating the decision back to a political process
whose determinations about political expression are usually subject to
substantial suspicion.
Thus, even though protection of expression possesses special potential to correct political malfunction, defining the judicial role in
that protection requires analysis of both political malfunction and judicial capacity. We can expect variations in the degree to which the
judiciary reviews and remakes governmental regulation of expression
based on these factors.
Access to the vote and the reapportionment of legislative districts
are clearly issues directly connected to the political process. Arguably
this connection provides a potential for correction of political malfunction so great that it does not take much in the way of political
malfunction or judicial capacity to make out a case for judicial intervention. In fact, there are ample reasons to suppose that the political
process suffers from serious malfunction in the determination of voting
questions and that these issues are tractable for the courts.
In the case of voting and redistricting, the "ins" bias has a valid
claim as a sufficient condition for political malfunction. A state legislature, elected by a distorted voter base, is well positioned to preserve
that base since those who can vote them out are precisely those voters
101. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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who benefit from the distortion. (In this instance, the "ins" constitute
not only those in office but also those who put them there and who
have the votes to throw them out.)
The Supreme Court appears to have adopted this view in its reapportionment cases. 102 Moreover, it has limited the resource costs of
intervention by employing a sweeping solution: one person, one vote.
This simple approach sidestepped the intractable process of balancing
such concerns as population, land mass, and tradition. Like other
sweeping solutions, the one person, one vote rule came at the cost of
some arbitrariness since the criteria which were suppressed have relevance.103 We will return to this subject shortly. But this sweeping
solution had the ring of general principle and allowed the judiciary to
take on issues which had significant potential to indirectly correct
political malfunction.
Thus, the attraction of such political process correction as protection of political expression and access to the vote can be joined with a
strong case for the need for judicial protection. There remain, however, important questions of just how this correction takes place and
how it operates in response to majoritarian and minoritarian bias.
These process corrections all aim at making information, organization, or the vote more generally accessible. As such, they decrease the
relative advantage of concentrated interests who trade upon their superiority in gathering information, organizing, and gaining access to
power through nonvoting channels. But what perfects the process visa-vis minoritarian bias may do little for and, in fact, aggravate
majoritarian bias. Government bureaucrats whose manipulations of
programs reflect the will of a majority have little to fear from public
exposure or an expanded franchise. Majoritarian bias is generated
when simple democracy works too well. The majority knows its interest and votes it. Because that interest is unweighted, however, a minority suffers substantial losses for disproportionately small gains to
the majority.
Thus, judicial responses like the basic rule of American voting
rights - one person, one vote - are well suited to the dissipation of
minoritarian bias. But this emphasis on pure majoritarianism can reenforce majoritarian bias. In the extreme, if it were possible to fully
perfect the process by making every citizen totally aware of his or her
own interest and able to translate immediately that interest into an
effective vote, minoritarian bias would disappear, but majoritarian bias
102. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
10~,

Consider the sorts of factors discussed by Justice Harlan, dissenting in Reynolds v.

Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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would be worse.104
Examined from this perspective, the various components of
Carolene Products - the holding of the case and the principal concerns expressed in the footnote - are very much interrelated. The
holding abandons serious judicial review of economic regulation,
thereby leaving dispersed majorities like consumers unprotected from
the minoritarian bias which often characterizes governmental decisions about economic regulation. However, paragraph two of the
Carolene Products footnote promises indirect aid to these dispersed
majorities by strengthening their access to and participation in the
political process. There remains the question of protecting against
majoritarian bias which is uncorrected and perhaps even aggravated
by the protection of paragraph two. Paragraph three of the footnote
responds by promising special judicial examination of those actions
most likely infected by majoritarian bias.
In brief, it appears that the Carolene Products Court's concern for
protection of discrete and insular minorities was correct and remains
so. Minoritarian bias is lessened by judicial protection which opens
the political process. But majoritarian bias is not. In general, the
courts can address majoritarian bias only by the continued case-bycase substitution of judicial decisions for decisions made by the defective political process.
The structural characteristics of adjudication discussed earlier105
also make the judiciary a better candidate for protection of concentrated minorities than for protection of dispersed majorities. The
worst instances of minoritarian bias involve highly dispersed and dormant majorities such as consumers and taxpayers. Because of the
costs of information and organization, these groups are unlikely to be
able to organize and finance litigation. The victims of majoritarian
bias, on the other hand, should find the organization of litigation easier. These are identifiable and often concentrated victims. A judicial
104. Compare the following observations on the use and abuse of the modern media:
Before the day of the big-circulation newspaper, the radio, and television there was usually little likelihood that information or sensation produced by legislative inquiry would
reach beyond the capital city.... [P]owerful tendencies worked toward political apathy and
despair; individuals felt cut off from understanding the social currents that tossed their lives,
lost confidence that they could significantly affect what happened to them, had difficulty in
perceiving where common interests lay. This setting created a constructive role for legislative inquiry directed at informing public opinion, and even at arousing public worry, anger,
or urgent demand. But the availability of the new mass audience was tempting to ruthless
political ambition. Armed with committee subpoena powers, a headline-hunting legislator
now could find a new avenue to personal power ... at whatever expense to individuals or
groups pilloried by his shrewd manipulation of damaging testimony.
J. HURST, supra note 34, at 125.
105. See Part III.A.2 supra.
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process structured for easier minority access is, therefore, more hospitable than a majoritarian political process.
The analysis of the effect of process correction on the two polar
biases and the associated case for judicial focus on majoritarian bias is
subject to some qualification. Even if these process corrections operate
against minoritarian bias, they hardly remove it. Courts occasionally
still react to this potential for minoritarian bias by direct scrutiny and
invalidation of legislation thought infected by it. 106
It is also possible to imagine situations in which improved political
interchange might decrease majoritarian bias. If this improved interchange made the majority feel more sympathetic to the minority's
interest, there would be an alleviation of majoritarian bias. It was
hoped, for example, that the racial integration of schools might improve relations between black and white children and decrease the
effectiveness of old stereotypes (simple symbols). If increased interchange also was to increase interaction and interdependence between members of the majority and the minority, it would become
increasingly difficult to tailor government action which safely targeted
only the minority.
Even given these qualifications, however, judicial activity in direct
reaction to majoritarian bias seems both more necessary and more feasible given the greater possibility that majoritarian bias will survive
judicial correction of the political process and the greater chance that
minority claims will be represented in the judicial process. Although
these are admittedly only rough tendencies, such insights are important in an analysis as constrained and approximate as that which the
judiciary must undertake.
2. Direct Review, Majoritarian Bias, and Well-Defined Minorities
As we have seen, majoritarian bias in particular survives well (perhaps flourishes) in an open, majoritarian system. In some instances of
severe majoritarian bias and for some social issues, the courts have
assumed the obligations of review and redecision. This has especially
been the case where severe majoritarian bias is associated with identifiable, traditional minorities. We earlier connected the characteristics
of those minorities traditionally protected in constitutional law and
the characteristics of majoritarian bias set out here. 107 Identifying im106. See note 129 infra.
107. See Part 11.B.3 supra. There we linked the discreteness, insularity, and immutability of
these minorities with the attributes of majoritarian bias - a highly burdened minority and a lowimpact yet politically active majority. Such minorities are safe targets for these burdens because
they can be easily identified and localized (discrete and insular), and are otherwise unlikely to
enter the majority or be entered by members of the majority (immutable). Activating an other-
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portant sources of political malfunction, however, is only part of the
case for judicial protection of minorities. Determining judicial protection also requires consideration of the difficulties or costs of that protection and a careful match between political malfunction and judicial
response. 108
Judicial protection of these traditional groups takes a wide variety
of forms and degrees of strength, reflecting variations in the severity of
political malfunction and the costs of judicial response. As foreshadowed by the language of the Carolene Products footnote, the prime
examples of judicial protection of minorities appear in cases dealing
with race. The courts have doggedly pursued racial desegregation of
public facilities, and in particular the public schools. Modem equal
protection jurisprudence - suspect classification and two-tiered scrutiny - was forged in race cases.
From an institutional perspective, it is easy to understand why race
is the classic suspect classification. Racial minorities are safe targets.
They are usually physically distinct and often geographically localized. It is virtually impossible to leave or enter a racial category. The
dismal political history of nonwhites has seen them excluded from voting by law and later by local practice.
Yet even the judicial treatment of race has not been straightforward or uniform. There are variations in the degree to which racial
classifications are reviewed by the courts. These variations within the
race cases can also be seen as the product of underlying variations in
the basic institutional factors of political malfunction and judicial
capacity.
On one level, racial classifications have been relatively easy for the
courts to handle. Where express racial classifications are involved and
operate to the detriment of racial minorities, the courts are often in a
position to employ sweeping solutions which simply forbid the political process any use of racial classifications. Government officials have
usually justified such racial classifications as means of preventing rawise dormant low-impact majority is easier when the societal issue can be cast in simple and
traditional terms - like race, alienage, and gender - with which members of that majority can
easily identify.
108. As a general matter, the existence of well-defined, traditional groups probably increases
the prospects of protection by reducing the difficulty of formulating and implementing judicial
response. Courts constrained in their ability to recognize majoritarian bias and to administer the
associated system of protection predictably focus on easily definable, traditional groups with a
recognized history of abuse by political processes. As a matter of description, one can expect
that less easily defined or traditional minorities will face a more difficult time winning protection.
Such minorities would face the significant task of educating the courts on their plight. This
suggestion comes from my colleague Bill Clune, who argues that the most powerless minorities
might simply go unnoticed by the courts.
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cial violence, unrest, and tension. These justifications have been rejected by the courts long before the modem era of equal protection 109
and continue to meet similar sweeping rejection. 110 This sweeping rejection of racial classifications, at least where they operate to the detriment of minorities, seems to be the product of the small range of valid
use and the significant chance of misuse by the government combined
with the difficulty of the courts in discerning between valid and invalid
use.
It would, for example, be simple minded to suggest that racial tension is not a reality and a danger which a perfect societal decisionmaker could consider. The white child in Palmore v. Sidotl 111
raised by her white mother and her black stepfather, could be the target of significant prejudice and derision. Why should a state family
law court assigned the task of protecting the interests of this child be
precluded from considering these effects in its custody decision?
Much of the answer lies in the high probability of misuse of such criteria by the highly imperfect political process. The government's justification itself highlights the existence of the conditions for majoritarian
bias. It shows that race is a conscious criterion for members of the
majority and that, therefore, the majority is unlikely to be dormant
here. Where the existence of racial tension can be used as a factor in
taking a child from a white mother who marries a black man, there is
a significant chance that this factor will be overweighed by the political process with little weight given to the needs or interests of members of a racial minority or those who marry them. The Court simply
cannot trust that the classification would be aptly applied nor is it able
to make the necessary distinctions itself. The costs of a sweeping solution here seem justifiably low, although not zero. 112
But such relatively easy solutions hardly characterize all of the racial issues which have faced or will face the courts. In some instances,
greater difficulty has produced greater judicial involvement. Thus, for
109. E.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
110. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
111. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
112. The Palmore Court claimed that any consideration of racial tension in the custody decision was impermissible because it gave official recognition to this wrongful social phenomenon.
Such an argument implies that racial tension could not be considered even where the result was
favorable to the minority. That argument would neglect the much lower chance of political
malfunction where a pro-minority determination is involved.
Notwithstanding the Court's assertion, it seems likely that the result in Palmore would have
been different if the family court judge had considered the same racial tension as reason for
increasing the child support owed by the white father in order to allow the child to attend private
school or receive special counseling. This result is consistent with the analysis of reverse discrimination presented subsequently. See text at notes 120-24 infra.
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enmple, the treatment of racial bias in public education has seen aggressive judicial intervention in the face of difficult societal policy decisions. Education is both important and complex. Vast amounts of
public funds are expended on public education and huge administrative networks chum out a wide variety of educational decisions. Formulation and execution of educational policy is often controversial
and difficult. The courts cannot easily treat school desegregation with
simple formulae and sweeping solutions. Racial desegregation cannot
be easily separated from issues like staffing, organization, funding, and
educational philosophy. In addition, strong opposition to desegregation by the white majority creates a political advantage for governmental officials in resisting court action which, in tum, means more
court action in order to oversee and administer previous judicial
orders.
Despite substantial and continuing outlays of judicial resources
and significant criticism, the federal courts have generally resisted the
pressures toward timidity in school desegregation. The involvement of
the courts has been substantial and far reaching, spawning innovative
administrative techniques to allow district courts to cope with a responsibility which forces them to supervise ongoing educational decisions for long periods of time. m
But, even in connection with race, the courts have not always or
even usually been so tenacious when faced with significant strains on
their resources and capability. A major example of timidity is the
court's general response to implicit racial classification. Invalidating
only express racial classifications often provides very little protection
for minorities. A political process pushed by active majorities can
trample the interests of politically weak minorities without recourse to
explicit racial classifications. Severe harm can be hidden in the folds
of complex but important government activity such as educational administration and land use planning.
The courts have severely controlled their role in most complex social programs by limiting their pursuit of implicit racial classifications
through the use of a motive or purpose test. In Washington v. Davis 114
the Court announced that it would not accept disproportionate racial
impact as a sufficient test for the presence of racial classification and,
therefore, for serious judicial intervention. Instead, it required a
showing that the relevant governmental officials had been motivated
by illicit racial concerns.
113. See M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 85.
114. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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Earlier I argued that it was a mistake to base the definition of political malfunction on the intent, motive, or purpose of government officials. Evil mental states are neither necessary nor sufficient to the
conceptions of political malfunction employed in this article. To the
extent that this motive test reflects the Court's perception of political
malfunction, my earlier criticism of Ely's similar position applies to
the Court: motive or purpose are poor indicators of political
maJfunction. 115
There are several indications, however, that the Court's emphasis
on motivation actually reflects concerns about its own limitations as a
decisionmaker. First, the Court's relevant opinions emphasize judicial
limitations. In Washington v. Davis, Justice White's majority opinion
emphasized the dire implications of employing an impact standard.
He pointed to the correlation between income and race and the significant chance that even legislation intended to aid the poor might harm
them. 116 According to this view, the courts would have been forced to
apply strict scrutiny to a vast, ill-defined, and complex set of social
legislation.
Second, the Court's use of the motive test vacillates, following a
pattern which seems always to limit the judicial role. Before Davis, the
federal courts had supposed that disproportionate impact was the test.
In at least two prominent cases before Davis, the Court had appeared
to reject motive tests. In Palmer v. Thompson 117 the Court refused to
find unconstitutional the closing of a public swimming pool even
though the closing was clearly carried out for racial motivations. The
Court there pointed to the absence of disproportionate impact. In
United States v. O'Brien 118 the Court refused to consider evidence of
the mental states of the legislators to show that federal legislation forbidding the destruction of selective service cards was intended to stop
demonstrations against the war in Vietnam.
One common element in these conflicting pronouncements is that
the scope of constitutional rights and of judicial action is consistently
controlled. Motivation is required in Davis and the judicial role is limited. Impact is required in Palmer and the judicial role is limited.
Motivation is declared not relevant in O'Brien and the judicial role is
limited. One need not be cynical to see the Court's concern about the
limits of the judiciary.
There is no doubt that the Court had to find a way to confine those
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Part II.C supra.
426 U.S. at 248.
403 U.S. 217 (1971).
391 U.S. 367, 383·84 (1968) ..
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issues which would be regarded as racial and which would, therefore,
receive serious judicial attention. Virtually any governmental decision
has differential impacts, and often these impacts fall differently on different income groups. Many programs have a regressive distributive
effect. Moreover, the correlation between race and income is substantial. Thus, there are grounds for Justice White's fears, expressed in
Washington v. Davis, that a racial impact test could place far too great
a demand on the courts.
A motive or purpose test looks like a neat tool to limit this demand. It has the appearance of a principle related to basic conceptions of political malfunction. It may even be a rough indicator of
political malfunction. Where race is discussed by decisionmakers or
otherwise appears to be a conscious consideration, it may be more
likely that majoritarian bias rather than minoritarian bias is present.
It is second nature to speak of legislation in terms of purpose.
Viewed more carefully, however, the test is neither easy to apply
nor a good representation of political malfunction. In most contexts,
the numbers of official governmental decisionmakers alone swamps realistic attempts to define collective intent. The Court has shown itself
ambivalent about using the test for decisionmaking institutions of
more than a few members. Identifying the intentions of large legislatures, let alone statewide referenda, poses serious conceptual
problems. 119 More importantly, reliance on intent as the sole criterion
for distrust of the political process focuses on the wrong aspects of
political decisionmaking. It ignores the structure of decisionmaking,
the configuration of voting strength, and the undue influence of organized minorities or nondormant majorities. The absence of these central features diminishes the relevance of inquiries about the mindset of
legislators and administrators.
It would seem better for the courts to resurrect an impact test and
limit the judicial role by such criteria as the severity and directness of
that impact. Directness could be determined by asking whether it was
reasonable to assume that the severe impact would be generally recognized or expected at the time the legislation was passed. Such a test
removes the need to scrutinize the actual debates or conversations and
119. O'Brien reflects the limits of Davis when it is applied to a large body of decisionmakers.
In Davis and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Haus. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (further
articulating the Davis standard), the governmental decisionmaking bodies were small - city
councils or administrative agencies. What is the rule when the entity is as large as a state legisla·
ture or Congress? The enduring problem of defining collective intent or purpose already inherent
in Davis and Arlington Heights is significant here. See Back to the Future, supra note 8, at 203-10.
Most representatives are unlikely to express motivation or purpose and there are likely to be a
multiplicity of purposes.
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to define collective intent. It also broadens the focus of inquiry beyond
immediate government officials thereby recognizing the systemic nature of political malfunction. At the same time, however, the test
would allow the courts to limit the degree to which they must track
racial impact through the tangle of ever more indirect interactions
with other social factors.
The treatment of implicit racial classifications is not the only example of major variation in the degree of judicial intervention on race
issues. Explicit racial classifications aiding racial minorities have also
been treated differently from those harming racial minorities. The
Court has upheld affirmative action programs despite the presence of
explicit racial classifications and claims by members of the Court that
the same standard of strict scrutiny is applicable to any explicit
classification. 120
Whatever the claims of these Justices, the scrutiny actually applied
to these reverse discrimination cases operates much differently in practice. For over forty years the presence of explicit racial classifications
signaled the application of a strict scrutiny standard which has always
been fatal. In many instances, the legislation struck down had been
justified as a reaction to racial prejudice and tension. 121 The Court has
allowed the existence of this racial prejudice and tension to justify the
use of racial criteria only in the context of programs in which the benefited are members of racial minorities and the burdened are members
of racial majorities.
The analysis proposed in this article endorses a diminished judicial
role in these reverse discrimination cases. Although majoritarian bias
makes government action which harms racial minorities severely suspect, government action which harms racial majorities is not subject to
the same bias. On a simple level, such action is an example of
counterbias - an instance in which a decision runs against the systemic bias. As indicated earlier, the existence of a malfunction or bias
does not mean that all results will be contrary to the underrepresented
group; they will just occur less often. These counterbias results occur
120. Four major racial affirmative action cases have been decided by the Supreme Court on
constitutional grounds. In two, United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), and Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court declared the program in question valid. In two,
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267 (1986), the Court declared the program in question invalid. There also have been
two instances in which the Court has approved affirmative action plans against,claims that they
violated civil rights legislation prohibiting racial discrimination. United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979); Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). It disapproved such a plan in Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
121. E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), discussed in note 112 supra and accompanying text.
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despite a malfunction not because of one. Thus, at least at a simple

level of analysis, there is no need for the review and remaking of such
governmental decisions by the judiciary. A very low standard of scrutiny is needed.
This simple analysis, however, requires qualification. Reasons exist
to distrust the political process in the context of reverse discrimination. Despite claims of reverse discrimination, a program can be employed to harm the minority in question. The racial minority may be
harmed and the majority aided and that effect hidden in the folds of a
complex program. Similarly, one racial or ethnic minority may be
aided to the direct detriment of another. 122 The presence of
majoritarian bias should make the courts wary of such outcomes.
Counterbias operates to reduce distrust only when the politically more
powerful group carries the burden.
But a more sweeping claim of bias can be connected to reverse
discrimination. No government program generates effects which fall
uniformly on all members of large aggregates like racial minorities or
majorities. The detriments of reverse discrimination programs do not
fall on all whites. Instead they fall on that small group of whites who
are denied access to the benefits of the program - admission to medical school, access to government contracts, and access to government
jobs. These are groups with small numbers. On what grounds do we
suppose that the interests of this small group is adequately represented
(let alone, overrepresented) in the political process? 123
The answer to this question lies in the realities of judicial review.
Only the most severe and lasting political malfunctions can be claimed
as the basis of judicial intervention. Most government programs - at
least viewed in isolation - have a detrimental impact on only a small
group. The small minority of whites are almost certainly not perfectly
represented in the political processes which produced the affirmative
action programs in question. But that small group lacks the characteristics we have associated with severe majoritarian bias.
Those characteristics were a low-impact but still politically active
majority, and a.severely harmed minority. In tum, that meant that
the minority in question must be a safe target because members of the
majority would not want to run a serious risk of slipping into the severely harmed category. There is little reason to believe that the majority of whites, although immediately unharmed by affirmative action
programs, could feel comfortable that they faced little or no risk of
122. These cautions about reverse discrimination were articulated by Justice Brennan in his
concurring opinion in Carey, 430 U.S. at 172-76.
123. Justice Scalia uses this sort of argument in his dissent in Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1472-76.

February 1988]

A Job for the Judges

713

falling into the harmed category. As the number of affirmative action
plans has grown, so has the chance that present or future programs
will impact a large number of whites.124
The political processes which fashion affirmative action programs
are not even close to perfect. But that is the situation for virtually all
governmental decisions. Much stronger indications of intractable bias
are necessary before judicial intervention can be justified, especially in
so difficult and complex a field. By the analysis employed here, unless
such a case is made the decision should remain with the political
process.
Various other identifiable groups besides racial, religious, and ethnic minorities have received some degree of judicial protection. Here
we will consider two of these groups - women and the poor - both
because they have received significant attention from constitutional
analysts and because the institutional analysis of judicial protection
differs significantly between the two groups as well as between them
and racial minorities.
Gender is a classification never officially termed suspect by the
Court but which nonetheless has received heightened scrutiny (even
before it was called heightened scrutiny). Many factors in our analysis
favor the vision that women are likely targets of political malfunction.
Gender classifications are immutable in both senses of that term. Gender is the oldest and most traditional distinction - the simplest of
symbols, as likely to produce immediate reactions as race and religion.
Women were excluded from the vote for most of our history. Gender
is a discrete, bifurcated classification with easier identification even
than race. There are many racial minorities and restrictions on one
race may become restrictions on another. There are only two genders;
in that sense, gender is more discrete than race.
There are, however, two elements which may decrease the force of
the case for judicial protection of women from majoritarian bias. The
most obvious is that women are not a minority. Women have the potential for significant voting strength. Women are also not insular.
Women regularly interact with men in the household, in the school,
124. It is also possible to argue that minoritarian bias prevails. Racial minorities can be
effective special interests. They are often instrumental in the passage of affirmative action plans
- although in many instances their influence is felt through their threat to use the courts rather
than direct influence in the political process. But again the question is whether affirmative action
plans are a context for minoritarian bias extreme enough to call for judicial replacement of the
political process. Minoritarian bias is most severe when the low-impact majority would likely
ignore the issue involved because that issue is unfamiliar and inaccessible. Affirmative action
issues do not readily fall into that category. Such plans receive substantial attention in the media
because they interest people. Although concentrated racial minorities have been politically effective, affirmative action is not likely to be a fruitful context for long-term minoritarian bias.
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and in the general community. As such, there is a significant chance
that the negative impact of laws on women will have negative spillover
effects on men. To that extent, women may not be safe targets.
This lack of insularity, however, can also be seen as a disadvantage
for women. As Ackerman has argued, the dispersion of women may
make organization more difficult. 125 On an even more subtle level, the
interactions between men and women may not always or perhaps even
usually produce empathetic relations with men. They may form contexts in which the interests of women are suppressed in favor of men.
This is the world which feminists, in particular, have presented. 126 If
the lack of insularity does not work to increase the positive interdependence of men and women, women remain the safe target that their
physical immutability dictates, although their large numbers give
them a political potential not shared by other safe targets.
This more complex picture of the treatment of women in the political process stands as a general reminder that the analytical constructs
employed here, like all such intellectual devices, cannot capture the
full texture of reality. Their application in any given area remains subject to review and debate. Yet they are valuable as a first cut at questions of institutional analysis and provide a framework which can help
us understand the judicial treatment of even so difficult an area as gender discrimination.
From this vantage, the judicial approach to gender discrimination
seems to be built not on fear of an overpowering majoritarian bias but
rather the presence of a workable combination of minoritarian bias
and ease of administration. Women can easily be seen as a dormant
majority. Many laws employing gender classification exclude women
from occupations or business. Such exclusions are typical of economic
regulations by which concentrated groups seek to limit competition in
general. These exclusions are aided in the gender setting by common
stereotypes about women.
On the other hand, women would seem to have a less potent claim
of minoritarian bias than other dormant majorities, such as consumers
and taxpayers. That women are a discrete group tends to reduce the
likelihood of dormancy. Discreteness, a disadvantage for a minority
against majoritarian bias, is an advantage for a majority against minoritarian bias.
Discreteness here, however, can serve as an advantage for judicial
125. See Ackerman, supra note 33, at 729, 742.
126. See, e.g., c. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); c. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979); Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professio11a/ Lall•
guage, and Legal Change, 101 HARV. L. REV. (1988) (forthcoming).
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intervention because it makes intervention easier - so long as the
courts do not search much beyond explicit classifications. At least as
to express gender categories, sweeping solutions seem quite usable.
These classifications can be struck down with little loss. Gender is
usually justified as a rough approximation of some other characteristic
such as strength. More direct tests are usually available thereby decreasing the need for gender as an approximation.
The Court has taken a "low cost" approach to gender discrimination by scrutinizing gender classifications only so long as they are explicit and do not force the Court to confront difficult substantive areas.
When, however, the legislation raises the prospect of greater expense,
either by going beyond explicit gender classifications or by raising
questions of gender equality in difficult substantive contexts, the Court
seems to make an abrupt halt. The Court has taken a largely mechanical approach, striking down virtually all express gender classifications
and ignoring implicit classifications even where the implications were
very strong. 127 Even an attenuated threat of facing traditionally difficult subject matter seems to have caused the Court to back off from
serious scrutiny of the congressional exclusion of women from the requirement to register for the military draft. 128 Such timidity again
reveals a limited judicial commitment to scrutiny of gender classifications. Judicial reaction to gender discrimination, like the reaction to
commercial speech and some laws reviewed under the dormant commerce clause, may only be a small scale incursion against minoritarian
bias made tractable by the limits of constitutional doctrines designed
for other purposes.129
The case for judicial protection of the poor, another of Ackerman's
127. An extreme example is Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), where the Court refused to see a gender classification in the exclusion of pregnancy from California's employee
disability insurance coverage.
128. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
129. A deep distrust for minoritarian bias continuously prompts limited judicial reactions
against it. On isolated occasions, both the Warren and Burger Courts have been tempted back to
direct scrutiny ofminoritarian bias. In Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), the Warren Court
struck down an Illinois statute which placed requirements on all financial institutions except one,
American Express.
Although the Burger Court subsequently overruled Morey in New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297 (1976), it built its own havens for direct review of minoritarian bias. The most obvious of
these is commercial speech. Until recently, commercial speech had been excluded from the rigorous protection accorded speech in general. Precedent certainly did not compel the Burger
Court to extend protection here. The first amendment, however, provides a convenient haven for
direct judicial reaction to minoritarian bias.
Suppression of competition in the guise of consumer protection is the classic form of minoritarian bias. One standard way to control competition is restriction of advertising. Although
restriction of advertising is neither the most frequent nor the most flagrant form of control on
competition perpetuated by special interests, the special nature of speech established by the first
amendment (on other grounds) provides a convenient (if arbitrary) limit which allows the courts
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examples, 130 is quite different from the case for protection of women.
Here, although there may be stronger reasons for protection, there are
far more problems in providing it. Unlike women, the poor by most
definitions are far from a majority of the nation, of any state, or even
of most locales. Poverty is often associated with low education and
transience. The rate of participation in the political process is significantly lower for the poor than the nonpoor.
The poor are dispersed and diffuse in quite a different sense than
women and with quite different effects. Although the poor may be
dispersed geographically in the sense that poverty exists throughout
the nation, they are in many instances geographically isolated. The
urban poor are likely to be concentrated in certain neighborhoods in
the center city, seldom in the suburbs. They can be easily targeted
geographically, and since they have very little interaction with the
more affiuent there will be little spillover, which adds to the ease of
targeting. Zoning laws can increase income segregation; often that is
their purpose. Income segregation aids easy targeting.
The only factor arguing against considering the poor a discrete minority is that poverty is not immutable - at least in theory. The poor
become nonpoor and vice versa. It is unlikely, however, that many
nonpoor will become poor and, therefore, the poor are relatively safe
targets. 131
to cut off the indistinguishable mass of regulation which would swamp the courts' abilities and
resources.
The federal courts also actively review legislation subject to minoritarian bias under the ru·
bric of the dormant commerce clause. It is common to see political malfunction here in the
absence of representation of outside interests in the state. On this theory, interstate commerce
needs judicial protection because the harms of regulation fall on those outside the state. In some
instances, it is accurate to find the losers from such restrictions out of state and the winners in
state. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
Many dormant commerce clause cases, however, involve restrictions on out-of-state competition with in-state sellers. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commn., 432 U.S. 333
(1977). Like any restrictions on competition, the losers include the consumers of the restricted
product and, in these cases, those are in-state consumers. If such state laws suffer from political
malfunction, it is minoritarian bias. The problem is not the absence of an in-state interest which
might bear loss. The problem is the absence of activity by such a group. The major losers from
restrictions on competition - whether in-state or out-of-state competition - are in-state consumers. As such, the dormant commerce clause, with its ostensible interest in bias against outof-state interests, hosts a subset of the more pervasive minoritarian bias. Like commercial
speech, the conventional rubric allows for a convenient cutoff from the mass of government
actions subject to minoritarian bias.
130. See Ackerman, supra note 33, at 729, 739.
131. Such an assertion, of course, depends on the definition of "poor." Poverty and indigence are defined in a number of ways. Yet even given a generous definition of poverty, the
probability that most nonpoor would become poor seems low.
The only relevant study of which I am aware indicates that, based on data from the 1970s,
there is less than an 8% chance that someone in the upper 60% of the income distribution would
fall into the lowest 20% of that distribution over a seven-year period. G. DUNCAN, YEARS OF
POVERTY, YEARS OF PLENTY, 12-14 (1984). The upper limit of this lowest twenty percent is
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There is, then, a strong case that the poor suffer significant
majoritarian bias. The major problem with protecting the poor lies in
the difficulties of providing that protection. Review of legislation affecting the poor poses issues of income redistribution. This topic lies
at the core of social decisionmaking and arises in virtually every substantive setting. Where legislation (or legislative inaction) directly confronts income redistribution, the courts are competing with the
political process for one of the most pervasive and controversial social
issues. Virtually all laws redistribute income to some degree; tax laws
and welfare laws are only the most obvious examples. It is very difficult to imagine that serious review could take the form of sweeping
solutions. Without a confining strategy, the judicial role could easily
exceed its physical capacity and substantive competence.
The Supreme Court has made overtures of protection for the poor.
But it has narrowed that protection severely by confining itself to the
impact on the indigent of only a small range of substantive issues and
government actions. These government actions have usually involved
access of the poor to the courts and the political process (voting).
Courts have confined their role through the curious doctrine of fundamental rights. 132 Even here the courts have refused to review seriously
large-scale, controversial funding bills which can pervasively affect
fundamental rights, 133 while invalidating more idiosyncratic and narrow government actions. 134
Because of serious vulnerability to majoritarian bias, the poor need
judicial protection. But the challenge for proponents of that protection is to define a strategy which will allow the courts to review some
important government actions without facing the full range of distributive questions.
The existing constitutional decisions examined thus far have generally followed a pattern at least roughly consistent with the institutional
framework suggested in this article. Whether one agrees or disagrees
with the outcomes or the reasoning of these cases, one can recognize
the pattern; any differences seem to fall within a disputable range of
institutional assumptions. Normative assertions made thus far have
called for improved institutional results.
approximately thirty-five percent above the official poverty level, providing a broad definition of
"poor." Presumably, if one used the official poverty level to define "poor," the probability of
members of the majority of nonpoor becoming poor would be significantly lower.
132. We will discuss this doctrine at notes\136-38 infra and the accompanying text.
133. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (abortion funding).
134. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating a state law which effectively
prohibited an indigent from marrying until he had satisfied prior child support payments).
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But this sanguine mood does not always prevail and seems certainly broken by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick 135 In that case, the Court carried fundamental-rights reasoning to an institutionally perverse conclusion. According to that reasoning, the singling out of an insular, discrete minority for derogatory
treatment was a virtue which increased the constitutional validity of
the government action.
The Court in Bowers was asked to pass on the validity of Georgia's
sodomy law. The law had been attacked as a violation of the right of
privacy which had been declared a fundamental right almost twentyfive years earlier in Griswold v. Connecticut, 136 where the Court struck
down a law prohibiting the use of contraceptives. As indicated earlier,
the term "fundamental rights," as used in constitutional jurisprudence, is more opaque than most. 137 The list of fundamental rights is,
in fact, small. Many entries are familiar and can easily be linked to
traditional forms of political malfunction. 138 The right of privacy,
however, is not so easily cabined. It remains the most controversial,
most potentially expansive, and least understood fundamental right.
Griswold is one of those cases that snotty law professors love to
dissect, with its three concurring (and two dissenting) opinions locating the illusive right of privacy in various constitutional provisions
ranging from the penumbras of the first, fourth, and fifth amendments
to the ninth amendment to the basic tenets underlying the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Whatever the problems with
these doctrinal rationales, however, it is the inability of the Court to
define privacy, and the reasoning the various Justices used in attempting to do so, which gave rise to the strange logic of Bowers. In Griswold, various Justices went on at length about the dangers to home
and marriage from state interference with these traditional concepts.
135. 106 s. Ct. 2841 (1986).
136. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
137. See Part I supra.
138. Voting, appellate procedure, and political association are concerns closely connected to
the correction of political malfunction (especially minoritarian bias) discussed earlier. As we
have seen, indigence is often present when a violation of fundamental rights triggers strict scru·
tiny.
The ill-defined fundamental right to travel can also be broken down into familiar compo·
nents. The right to travel from one state to another seems consistent with a classic form of
political malfunction - state action operating on citizens of other states who have no vote in the
restricting state. Similar concerns about political malfunction underlie the commerce clause and
privileges and immunities clause. See J. ELY, supra note 4, at 89-91. In other guises, this right to
travel picks up the first amendment concerns about the protection of unpopular political posi·
tions, see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), or judicial reaction to racial or wealth discrimina·
tion. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250 (1974).
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From these vague ramblings in Griswold, it was easy to gather the
notion that it was the prohibition of sexual and procreative activities
of the most traditional sorts which should trigger judicial intervention.
Here fundamental rights are truly linked to fundamentalness. The
logic is simple - the more people who are seriously interfered with
the more serious the interference.
But that logic is not relevant to the central institutional issue the need for judicial protection. As the facts of Griswold show, such
circumstances are precisely where judicial protection is not needed.
No one was enforcing the law in Griswold. Those attacking the law
had a devil of a time producing sufficient controversy to get standing
and had failed on several occasions. This difficulty is perfectly consistent with the most straightforward institutional analysis: A state's attempt to interfere with activities which a vast majority consider
important is likely to be dealt with quite well by the political process.
That the Court should have expended so much effort on unneeded
protection in Griswold was at worst silly in that context. When the
Court in Bowers used the Griswold reasoning to justify a selectively
enforced sodomy prohibition in Bowers, however, the result is much
worse. Although the Georgia sodomy law does not explicitly single
out homosexuals, it is homosexuals who justifiably fear the law. This
select subgroup apparently was the only group at risk from enforcement of the Georgia law. In both the courts and the media, Bowers
was discussed primarily in terms of prohibition of a homosexual activity. More importantly, this narrow targeting of homosexuals made the
Georgia law more acceptable to the Court in Bowers, with both the
Court and the state of Georgia treating broader application of the statute as constitutionally suspect.
A sodomy law which in practice interfered with intimate relations
among married couples would interfere with the actions of more people. But that sort of broad application would also make judicial protection less necessary: The more widespread and important the
prohibited practice, the more likely that the prohibition will be reformed within the political process. The constitutional problem with
the sodomy laws is that the real threat of enforcement is focused on a
small group. Homosexuals can be singled out for enforcement without
serious fear of political reaction. That makes judicial protection more
important - not less.
There are good grounds, in fact, to consider homosexuals a group
in need of general judicial protection, like that accorded under strict
scrutiny equal protection. Homosexuals have a great many of the
characteristics of protected minorities. They are a discrete, easily de-
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fined group. Although immutability has been in issue, it is generally
thought that sexual proclivity is a disposition established early in life
(perhaps at birth) and unlikely to change. Homosexuals are often geographically insular. Sexual proclivity is another traditional subject
which can easily generate a visceral response among the heterosexual
majority. Certain religious groups have traditionally considered homosexuality a sin. These religious groups provide an organized subgroup capable of informing and organizing the heterosexual majority.
Although gays are vocal minorities in a few communities, they are
certainly a small minority in most locales, in all states, and in the
nation.
The reluctance of the Supreme Court even to recognize the need to
protect homosexuals seems difficult either to explain or to justify from
an institutional standpoint. Whether one is sympathetic to homosexuality or not, homosexuals are still a group which faces serious potential
for majoritarian bias. In Bowers, the Court could have confined its
protection of homosexuals to the issue of sexual conduct and even hidden it under the guise of the right of privacy. Instead, it rejected protection of sexual privacy in exactly the situation in which it was most
needed.
There are important societal issues where a prohibition severely
impacts unconventional lifestyles and raises the possibility of
majoritarian bias. It is possible to understand some of the Court's privacy decisions, as well as its protection of literary use of sexual images,
as a reaction to such majoritarian bias (even though they may be rationalized under the rubric of fourteenth amendment fundamental rights
or first amendment protection of expression). Minorities who suffer
from this bias are often defined only by the particular unconventional
lifestyle choice rather than by some more general and traditional minority classification. If because these minorities are not as easily defined as traditional minorities the courts choose to rationalize their
protection in terms of subject matter, then resulting semantic fictions,
like fundamental rights, are arguably understandable and tolerable.
But when courts and commentators distort the conceptions so that
decisions about judicial protection no longer relate to the need for
such protection, the fictions come at too high a cost. Lyrical discussions of fundamentalness couched in terms of the search for self-fulfillment or the tradition of the American home promote the sort of
twisted reasoning found in Bowers. If the courts are going to use the
notion of privacy to protect the conventional activities by those already able to protect themselves politically, they should drop the concept now. At the least, it wastes precious resources; at the worst, it
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adds to the problems of those unable to represent themselves in the
political process.
CONCLUSION

Referring to the Allied victory in North Africa and its meaning to
the prosecution of World War II, Winston Churchill allowed as how it
was not the end, nor even the beginning of the end, but was perhaps
the end of the beginning. In three articles, I have explored the need
for comparative institutional analysis which realistically and sophisticatedly portrays the complexities of societal decisionmaking in general
and of constitutional judicial review in particular. I have criticized
those constitutional commentators who have failed to seriously consider institutional features and those whose considerations were not
comparative or sufficiently developed. In this article, I have presented
an institutional analysis which I have found useful in understanding
constitutional law, history, and commentary, and I have applied it to a
wide range of these issues.
I do not, however, believe that this is the last word on institutional
analysis, let alone an encyclopedic review of all constitutional issues.
Most of the task of constructing and improving the necessary analytical tools and employing them to understand constitutional law remains to be done (if, in fact, such work can ever be completed).
Characterizing and studying the various parts of what I have called
the political process, exploring the troubling interaction between societal goals and institutional choice, and examining empirically all the
assertions about forms of bias and resource constraints just begin the
work list. This article is certainly not the end or even the beginning of
the end of this work.
Yet there is a beginning here which can be considered, criticized,
and built upon. Institutional tools have been defined and a framework
constructed. The analysis has been applied to constitutional decisions,
historical moments, and commentary. These constructs and applications are admittedly subject to debate and change, but even in their
present form they give judges and scholars something real to work
with. They are better than the attractive but fictitious imagery of original intent and the judicial search for overriding moral principles.
Constitutional law cannot be divorced from institutional reality and,
therefore, constitutional analysis ought not be divorced from institutional analysis. That such analysis is difficult and even troubling cannot be denied. But it also cannot be avoided.

